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Keynes, Sen, and Hayek: Competing 
Approaches to International Labor Law in 
the ILO and the WTO, 1994–2008 
Pascal McDougall*
In discussions of recent human rights-driven developments in the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), as well as in other international legal debates, many scholars have suggested 
that human rights and “neoliberalism” intrinsically tend to converge. Such purported 
convergence is at once deplored by critics of “globalization” and applauded by its defenders. This 
article offers an empirical refutation of this convergence thesis by documenting the potential for 
systematic divergences between human rights, neoliberalism and a third omnipresent discourse, 
social legal thought (i.e. tropes associated with the welfare state and Keynesianism). I support this 
claim by taking as a case study three interrelated and historically fateful debates about 
international labor standards in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the ILO. The debates 
are those pertaining to (1) the failed 1990s project of conditioning WTO trade status with respect 
for labor standards (“trade/labor linkage”), (2) the prioritization of human rights-based labor 
standards in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998 
Declaration) and (3) the shape of the ILO corpus under the Decent Work Agenda (DWA), a social 
policy programmatic initiative on labor standards fiercely debated in the 2000s. I argue that 
human rights, neoliberalism and social legal thought diverge a great deal because they have 
different degrees of normative malleability. I propose a methodology, structuralist argumentative 
analysis, to address the question of discursive convergence and divergence, an issue of crucial 
importance for those interested in the political stakes of debates on international labor standards 
and the future trajectories of neoliberalism and human rights.  
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I don’t concede that “rights talk” gives employers an 
inherent advantage, any more than “economics talk” gives 
advantage to unions. Both are fields of contest, and labor 
advocates have to fight it out on each front.1 
Lance Compa 
The ‘development’ of a thing, a tradition, an organ is 
therefore certainly not its progressus towards a 
goal, . . . instead it is a succession of more or less profound, 
more or less mutually independent processes of subjugation 
exacted on the thing, added to this the resistances 
encountered every time, the attempted transformations for the 




In recent decades, the International Labour Organization (ILO) was, along with the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the focus of intense debates about the normative approaches used to 
discuss labor/employment laws at the global level. Specifically, many observers noted the use of 
human rights tropes to advocate for international labor standards and argued that this approach 
was consistent and/or complicit with “neoliberalism,” and that it represented a shift away from 
traditional welfare state-oriented discourses. These debates were brought about in part by a series 
of institutional innovations designed to bring the ILO back to the center of global policy 
discussions on the regulation of employment markets. For instance, in 1998, ILO the adopted its 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998 Declaration), in which it gave 
priority status to four of its labor standards over all others: (1) freedom of association and the right 
to collective bargaining, (2) the prohibition of forced labor, (3) the prohibition of child labor and 
(4) the elimination of discrimination at work.3 These four standards were to be called “core labor 
rights” (CLR) and recognized by many actors as the only standards to be “mainstreamed” in other 
international organizations.4 The 1998 Declaration made the innovative move of imposing a new 
obligation on all ILO member states, regardless of whether or not they had ratified the relevant 
pre-existing ILO conventions, to “respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in 
accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the [CLR].”5 
The programmatic importance of this document can scarcely be overstated. Indeed, for many 
                                                 
1 Lance Compa, Solidarity and Rights: Two to Tango-A Response to Joseph A. McCartin, 80 INT’L LAB. & WORKING-
CLASS HIST. 161, 164 (2011). 
2 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 51 (Carol Diethe trans., 1994). 
3 International Labour Organization [ILO], Declaration On Fundamental Principles And Rights At Work, at 7 (June 
18, 1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm [hereinafter 
1998 Declaration]. 
4 See infra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
5 1998 Declaration, supra note 3, at 7. 
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actors the 1998 Declaration “emerged as the centrepiece of international efforts to remedy the 
plight of vulnerable workers in the global economy.”6 The prioritization of a restricted set of 
“basic” rights was considerably new for an organization committed since 1919 to a raft of 
international labor standards codified in over 190 conventions, from minimum unemployment 
insurance to working hours and occupational health and safety standards.7 The 1998 Declaration 
also represented the outcome of arguably the most ferocious debates about international labor 
standards since the Second World War. Indeed, the lead-up to the foundation of the WTO in 1995 
catapulted labor activists and policy-makers into a decade-long debate about “linkage” of trade 
and labor laws through things like a system of trade sanctions for violations of labor standards. 
This debate, as I demonstrate in this article, directly contributed to the adoption of the 1998 ILO 
Declaration. After 1998, the ILO continued on the path of institutional renewal by adopting the 
“Decent Work Agenda” (DWA) in 1999,8 whereby a set of programmatic goals of social policy 
reshaped the pre-1998 ILO conventions corpus. 
Reactions to the ILO’s 1998 Declaration and Decent Work Agenda were strong on the left. 
The 1998 Declaration was decried as “welcomed by multinational capital” because it 
“correspond[s] with a neoliberal economic view”.9 It privileges “a core set of largely procedural 
and essentially civil and political labor rights, thus conforming to the preferences of neo-liberal 
economic approaches.”10 It is “comfortably aligned with neo-liberal philosophy”.11 Etc.12 The 
Decent Work Agenda, for its part, was said to jettison “substantive material equality” in favor of 
“procedural justice,” conforming to “what the Employers wanted” and to the “assumptions” of the 
“disembedding phase of the ongoing Global Transformation, which is primarily about the creation 
of international markets, with all the inequalities and insecurities that this is generating.”13 Much 
of these debates have happened years after the 1998 Declaration and the DWA were adopted and 
fed into discussions about the ILO’s current normative agenda. 
In parallel to these controversies, many observers of international human rights law and the 
                                                 
6 Kerry Rittich, Core Labor Rights and Labor Market Flexibility: Two Paths Entwined?, in LABOR LAW BEYOND 
BORDERS: ADR AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LABOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 157, 160 (The International 
Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration eds., 2003); see also Anil Verma, Global Labour Standards, Can We 
Get from Here to There?, 19:4 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 515, 518 (2003) (observing that the 1998 
Declaration “has set a high moral tone for policy debate and action around the globe”). 
7 On this institutional history, see Virginia A. Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour 
Organisation, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 580 (Philip Alston ed., 1992). 
8 See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
9 Guy Standing, The ILO: An Agency for Globalization?, 39:3 DEV. & CHANGE 355, 367 (2008). 
10 Philip Alston & James Heenan, Shrinking the International Labor Code: An Unintended Consequence of the 1998 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work?, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 223 (2004); see 
also Philip Alston, ‘Core Labour Standards’ and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime, 15 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 457 (2004). 
11 Jill Murray, Taking Social Rights Seriously: Is there a Case for Institutional Reform of the ILO?, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
AT WORK: PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND REGULATION 359, 369 (Colin Fenwick & Tonia Novitz eds., 2010). 
12 Guy Mundlak, The Transformative Weakness of Core Labor Rights in Changing Welfare Regimes, in THE WELFARE 
STATE, GLOBALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 231, 233, 258 (Eyal Benvenisti & Georg Nolte eds., 2004) 
(observing that “the distinction [between CLR and labor standards] draws on a human rights discourse characteristic 
of civil and political rights at the national level” and of “negative rights” and thus “fails to integrate the jurisprudence 
historically associated with social and economic rights.” It “provides protection . . . against some abuses of labor but 
has little significance in the performance of functions relegated to the welfare state.”). 
13 Standing, supra note 9, at 357–58, 369. 
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constitutionalization en bloc of many domestic jurisdictions have asserted that both human rights 
and constitutionalization might be intrinsically complicit, if not coterminous with “neoliberalism” 
and/or classical liberal individualism (the claims vary).14 These broader discussions are extremely 
relevant to those on the 1998 Declaration, which has been described as “the first pronouncement 
expressly proclaiming a ‘human rights’ orientation for the ILO.”15 Of course, such a statement 
reminds one that the 1998 Declaration was adopted in the context of a global rightsification of 
labor and employment law, both domestic and international, whereby human (and constitutional) 
rights increasingly replace other ways of talking about that field.16 And there again, the left decries 
the complicity of rights with neoliberalism and/or right-wing libertarianism.17 On the ideological 
right and center-right, there is a mirror tendency to celebrate the putative compatibility (or even 
mutual reinforcement) between the free market (be it called “globalization,” “growth” or 
something else) and human rights, both in the context of labor/employment law and more 
generally.18 
                                                 
14 See SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE 
POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY 250 (2011) (arguing that in the context of international economic law, it is inevitable that 
“law and rights will be limited to the extent of their compatibility with prevailing economic orthodoxies”); Michèle 
Lamont, Jessica S. Welburn & Crystal M. Fleming, Responses to Discrimination and Social Resilience Under Neo-
liberalism: The United States Compared, in SOCIAL RESILIENCE IN THE NEOLIBERAL AGE 129, 148 (Peter A. Hall & 
Michèle Lamont eds., 2013) (observing that “neoliberalism may also encourage stigmatized group [sic] to make claims 
based on human rights […] while undercutting in practice collective claims by promoting individualization”); see also 
RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 44 
(2004) (observing that “proconstitutionalization elites […] often represent historically hegemonic enclaves of political 
and economic power-holders, who tend to adhere to an agenda of relative cosmopolitanism, open markets, formal 
equality, and Lockean-style individual autonomy”). For a different take to the effect that human rights discourse 
“legitimates” neoliberalism, see Wendy Brown, “The Most We Can Hope For . . . ”: Human Rights and the Politics 
of Fatalism, 103 S. ATLANTIC Q. 451, 461 (2004). For yet another take, claiming that neoliberalism is the central 
element of contemporary legal thought, to which human rights (and everything else in law since the 1970s) are but a 
“response,” see Christopher Tomlins, The Presence and Absence of Legal Mind: A Commentary on Duncan Kennedy’s 
Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, 1850–2000, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 15 (2015). 
15 Janice R. Bellace, Achieving Social Justice: The Nexus Between the ILO’s Fundamental Rights and Decent Work, 
155 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 5, 5 (2011); see also Alvaro Santos, Three Transnational Discourses of Labor Law in 
Domestic Reforms, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 123, 145–46 (2010). 
16 On this phenomenon, see the contributions to the following collections: HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK: PERSPECTIVES 
ON LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 11; WORKERS’ RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS (James A Gross ed., 2003); HUMAN 
RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Lance A. Nietzsche & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996). 
17 See e.g., Joseph A. McCartin, Probing the Limits of Rights Discourse in the Obama Era: A Crossroads for Labor 
and Liberalism, 80 INT’L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 148 (2011); Tonia Novitz & Colin Fenwick, Introduction: 
The Application of Human Rights Discourse to Labour Relations: Translation of Theory into Practice, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS AT WORK: PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 11, at 1, 37; see also Judy Fudge, The New 
Discourse of Labor Rights: From Social to Fundamental Rights?, 29 COMP. LAB. L.& POL’Y J. 29, 42 (2007). 
18 On the 1998 Declaration, the ILO states that “recognition of these fundamental rights [CLR] appears to be based on 
the same principles as those underlying the international trade system itself.” ILO, G7 Conference on Employment, 
The Social Dimension of the Liberalization of International Trade, G7/E.C./1996/1, (April 1996) (cited in FRANCIS 
MAUPAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 145 (2013)); see 
also Brian Langille, The ILO and the New Economy – Recent Developments, 15 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & IND. REL. 
229, 242 (1999) (“[T]he shift to a rights based conception is […] a ‘market friendly’ approach which appeals to, and 
is grounded in, the fundamental virtues of market ordering[—]free, informed and uncoerced choice[—]which are at 
the normative foundation of markets.”). On human rights more broadly, see Steve Charnovitz, The Globalization of 
Economic Human Rights, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 113, 115–16 (1999); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United 
Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from 
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In this Article, I argue that these views, inasmuch as they presuppose a convergence between 
human rights and neoliberalism, are mistaken, both in their conclusion and their implicit 
methodology. Taking guidance from recent work examining the contingent historical relationship 
between neoliberalism and human rights,19 I propose a methodology that leads me to the 
conclusion that human rights, in a variety of contexts that I propose to study, are not at all 
necessarily or even more likely to be complicit with neoliberalism or classical liberalism. I take as 
a case study a chain of debates in the period 1994–2008 that had profound impacts on the 
discursive landscape related to the promotion of international labor standards. These are the 
debates about (1) trade/labor “linkage” in the WTO, whereby advocates sought and failed to 
include respect for some labor standards as a consideration in the establishment of the trade regime 
in the 1990s, (2) the selection of the “core labor rights” to be included in the 1998 Declaration and 
(3) the shape of the ILO corpus in the context of the 1999 Decent Work Agenda and its relationship 
to the 1998 Declaration. I analyze contributions to these debates made by organs and officials of 
the WTO and ILO (in reports, statements, treaties, etc.), as well as by scholars influential in the 
epistemic communities of these organizations. 
On each of these three interrelated controversies, I chronicle the argumentative use of three 
normative approaches or paradigms: human rights, neoliberalism and another omnipresent yet 
under-studied discourse, social legal thought (i.e. organicist tropes associated with the welfare 
state and Keynesianism).20 I analyze potential convergence as a function of the discourses’ 
normative malleability, i.e. of the range of outcomes they are likely to lead to on the left-right 
ideological spectrum. Defining the advocated outcomes as relatively left-wing when more labor 
standards promotion is sought and relatively right-wing when the opposite is the case, I have found 
that in the context of my 1994–2008 debates the human rights language is the most malleable of 
all three, in the sense that it seems equally likely to be used to advocate for left-wing and right-
wing outcomes, while neoliberalism is somewhat malleable though more often identified with the 
right and social legal thought most decidedly identified with the left.21 My exploration of the three 
divergent degrees of normative malleability leads me to the conclusion that on balance 
convergence between human rights and neoliberalism (and social legal thought) is not more likely 
than divergence.22 It follows that the convergence thesis is wrong. The peculiar ideological 
                                                 
European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 621. 
19 Samuel Moyn, A Powerless Companion: Human Rights in the Age of Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 
(2014); Mary Nolan, Human Rights and Market Fundamentalism in the Long 1970s, in TOWARD A NEW MORAL 
WORLD ORDER? MENSCHENRECHTSPOLITIK UND VOLKERRECHT SEIT 172, 174 (Norbert Frei & Annette Weinke eds., 
2013). 
20 These languages correspond to Alvaro Santos’ Three Transnational Discourses of Labor Law in Domestic Reforms. 
Santos, supra note 15. 
21 This seems to confirm Duncan Kennedy’s claim that (neo)liberalism and social legal thought, which were once 
politically indeterminate, crystallized as respectively right-wing and left-wing in debates on economic and market-
related matters (as opposed to civil society and the family). Duncan Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in 
Contemporary American Legal Thought, 25 L. AND CRITIQUE 91, 115–16 (2014). 
22 I treat the degree of normative malleability as an empirical question depending not on the discourses’ internal 
properties but on the work performed by situated actors developing them in certain directions over time. This amounts 
to saying that current uses of, say, neoliberalism are limited by the weight of past arguments. Though of course such 
constraint is never total, the freedom to innovate is itself structured by past perceptions of what arguments are 
convincing in a repertoire. The analogy here is to the phenomenological view of the indeterminacy of legal doctrine. 
Duncan Kennedy, A Left Phenomenological Alternative to the Hart/Kelsen Theory of Legal Interpretation, in LEGAL 
REASONING: COLLECTED ESSAYS 153, 160 (2008). 
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configuration I found, whereby human rights can be both left and right, neoliberalism is mostly 
right-wing but can also be center-left and social legal thought is consistently left-wing, was by no 
means inevitable. It is the result of work by situated actors with ideological projects. As I will 
outline in my conclusion, it is also the product of many trends in the intellectual history of labor 
law. Nevertheless, it is likely to significantly influence the outcome of future policy discussions. 
As such, it deserves attentive and empirical study, and not mere blanket assertions of systematic 
convergence or divergence. 
Indeed, one important reason for my reading together of the three debates is that I have found 
that various arguments invoked in one controversy can be invoked in the others, and that the 
succession of disputes has created a cumulative repertoire of sedimented arguments that are still 
with us, to this day. As a result, the best way to understand how a given normative language works 
is to study it in a series of discussions that cumulatively produce its political valence and 
structure.23 This also suggests that since path dependence and cumulative causation are bound to 
play a role in any succession of controversies, the recent past has much to tell us about how future 
debates might play out.24 With this in mind, this article provides a systematic appraisal of some 
fourteen years of argumentation on the intersection of labor and international economic law. 
In fact, these three specific discussions seem particularly fateful for the future of international 
labor standards debates. I take for granted the importance of the WTO trade/labor linkage polemic, 
on which so much ink has been spilled.25 But the adoption of the 1998 Declaration, as well as 
subsequent disagreement as to its meaning and relationship to the broader ILO corpus and the 
Decent Work Agenda, are also influential global debates. Indeed, the core labor rights were 
incorporated (“mainstreamed”) across the international legal landscape by a plethora of 
institutions, from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to codes of corporate 
social responsibility and the U.N. Global Compact.26 The Decent Work Agenda and non-core ILO 
conventions were also incorporated into the U.N. Millennium Development Goals27 and the U.N. 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ directives on the “right to work” under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.28 The 1994–2008 labor standards 
debates therefore also seem fateful for many different international legal contexts where ILO law 
has been directly incorporated. 
The methodology I use is “structuralist,” in that I focus on how the normative and ideological 
structure of my three languages has evolved and not on other historical factors that may have 
                                                 
23 I follow Foucault in treating a given discourse’s structure as the product of work by situated actors, of “exegesis” 
by subsequent “commentators” not wholly constrained by an original “definitive statement” guiding the discourse. 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS 44–46 (2002). 
24 On this methodological point, see Justin Desautels-Stein, Structuralist Legal Histories, 78 L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 
37, 53–54 (2015). 
25 See infra Part I. 
26 See CHRISTINE KAUFMANN, GLOBALISATION AND LABOUR RIGHTS THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CORE LABOUR RIGHTS 
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 160–61 (2007); Mark Anner & Teri Caraway, International Institutions and 
Workers’ Rights: Between Labor Standards and Market Flexibility, 45 ST. COMP. INT’L DEV. 151, 151 (2010). 
27 See Gillian MacNaughton & Diane F. Frey, Decent Work, Human Rights and the Millennium Development Goals, 
7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 303, 306 (2010). 
28 U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS 
APPROACH TO POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES, 23–26, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/06/12 (2006). See MacNaughton & 
Frey, supra note 27, at 328, for discussion of the distinctions between the High Commissioner for Human Rights and 
the ILO’s approaches. 
 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [2017 
38 
steered the course of policy debates. I do think these other factors are of paramount importance 
and should be carefully studied. Argumentative structure is no more (but probably no less) 
important as a driving force of history than things like economic interests, historical accidents and 
political struggles.29 Yet I find it valuable to focus on argumentative structure, because it very 
often becomes historically salient by constraining and orienting future uses of legal discourse.30 I 
draw considerable inspiration from structuralist analyses which model legal discourse as a 
mechanism which to some extent constrains actors who want to employ it.31 
The application of such a structuralist methodology to debates about international labor 
standards is quite unprecedented in an otherwise rich literature. There are analyses documenting 
the various arguments made in the trade/labor linkage debates32 and controversies on the ILO’s 
1998 Declaration and Decent Work Agenda.33 These studies are invaluable, yet, in addition to 
tending to focus on one debate and failing to attend to the way various discourses are constructed 
by successive uses, none of them maps the arguments according to the normative approaches used. 
The one exception to this is Brian Langille’s 1997 article on trade/labor linkage debates, Eight 
Ways to Think About International Labour Standards, which categorizes arguments about 
trade/labor linkage according to the “conceptual schemes or paradigms” to which they belong.34 
Yet, that article is quite dated, does not deal with ILO debates per se and does not propose to map 
the normative malleability of the “paradigms” identified. That is, it does not catalogue the 
outcomes advocated for in the various discourses in order to categorize them politically. This is 
precisely the added value of my structuralist methodology, which allows us to empirically tackle 
the question of the relationship between human rights and neoliberalism, as well as to better 
understand the political stakes of uses of various normative languages in current and future debates 
about labor standards. 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., Robert O’ Brien, Workers and World Order: The Tentative Transformation of the International Union 
Movement, 26 REV. INT’L STUDIES 533, 553 (2000) (giving an account of international union campaigns for 
trade/labor linkage as being part of a radicalization of global unions after they were “expelled from the corridors of 
power in key states” of the West after the end of the Cold War, thereby abandoning their past role as defenders of 
Western capitalism against Soviet communism); see also Alston, supra note 10, at 466–69 (discussing the symbolic 
and economic motivations of the American government in pushing for the CLR agenda in the ILO). 
30 See Desautels-Stein, supra note 24, at 53–54. 
31 See Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are 
to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950); Jack M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986); Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE 
ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 309 (1994); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989); DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987). 
32 See Brian A. Langille, Eight Ways to Think about International Labour Standards, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 27 (1997); 
Raj Bhala, Clarifying the Trade-Labor Link, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 11 (1998); Rajib N. Sanyal, The Social 
Clause in Trade Treaties: Implications for International Firms, 29 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 381 (2001); Sope Williams, 
The WTO and Labour Rights Revisited, 14 SRI LANKA J. OF INT’L L.AW 135, 146 (2002); Junlin Ho, The International 
Labour Organization’s Role in Nationalizing the International Movement to Abolish Child Labor, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
337, 343 (2006); ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: RE-IMAGINING THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER 29–30 (2011). 
33 On the ILO’s 1998 Declaration, see Murray, supra note 11, at 364. For analyses that track arguments from 
trade/labor linkage through to ILO debates, see Mundlak, supra note 12, at 258; Alston, supra note 10, at 471–76. For 
analyses tracing the 1998 Declaration debates to those on the Decent Work Agenda, see Standing supra note 9; STEVE 
HUGHES & NIGEL HAWORTH, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION (ILO): COMING IN FROM THE COLD [ch. 
4–6] (2010). For an exceptional integrated treatment of my three debates which nevertheless abstains from engaging 
in a structural analysis of legal arguments, see KAUFMANN, supra note 26. 
34 Langille, supra note 32, at 29. 
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I proceed in four parts. Part I presents a brief chronology of the three debates to provide the 
minimal background necessary to understand the content of the arguments made. Parts II, III and 
IV contain the bulk of my analysis, dealing with arguments based on the neoliberal, human rights 
and social legal thought paradigms. Each of these parts presents arguments from the three debates, 
emphasizing resonance between the positions from each discussion and suggesting a cumulative 
process of discourse construction. The normative malleability of the discourse is strongly 
suggested in the case of human rights, much less strongly for neoliberalism, and almost not at all 
for social legal thought. Keeping track of these divergent structures is part of the intellectual 
démarche I propose to lawyers striving to better understand the political stakes of law, as well as 
those assessing how they should go about “speaking” labor standards to further partisan ideological 
goals through legal discourse. However, in the latter case, the difficulty is that the sedimented legal 
arguments I catalogue are not mere legal material to be assessed strategically from the outside. 
They also structure the extra-legal choices we must make in order to decide what to do with labor 
markets as an ideological or political matter. These conflicting arguments are both inside and 
outside of us, so to speak. They are both a strategic medium to be used and a source of ideological 
uncertainty as to how we might want to strategically use them. It thus seems imperative to get to 
know these arguments better. 
I. A CHRONOLOGY OF THREE DEBATES 
This part briefly traces a chronology of the debates I analyze from the period of 1994–2008, 
in order to make my analysis of the claims made during that period more intelligible. This 
chronology lays out the context in which actors used human rights, neoliberalism and social legal 
thought to confront each other, thereby bringing about the configuration described above whereby 
the three paradigms have different political valences that render any convergence between them 
unlikely. 
This historical sequence starts in 1994, with the closing of the Uruguay round of negotiations 
on the newly-founded WTO and discussions around the ILO’s 75th anniversary, and ends in 2008 
with the adoption of the ILO’s 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization (2008 
Declaration) and the outbreak of the Great Recession. I start with the debate on trade/labor linkage 
in the WTO and then assess ILO discussions on the 1998 Declaration’s “core labor rights,” the 
1999 Decent Work Agenda and the related 2008 Declaration, the chronological end point of my 
inquiry. 
A. Trade/Labor Linkage in the WTO 
During the 1986–1994 Uruguay round of negotiations which led to the founding of the WTO 
in 1995 and again at the first ministerial conference of the WTO in 1996, some Western states 
sought and failed to condition some forms of trading status on respect for labor standards.35 The 
mechanism most commonly put forward for such “linkage” proposals was the enabling of the 
imposition of trade sanctions on countries violating labor standards.36 Though the idea of linking 
trade and labor/employment laws had been around since at least the 19th century in domestic 
contexts,37 the first real (but failed) prospect for multilateral trade labor linkage was the never-
                                                 
35 See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Why International Labor Standards?, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: 
GLOBALIZATION, TRADE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 129, 148–49 (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould eds., 2003). 
36 See id. at 149–50. 
37 Edward Potter, The Growing Significance of International Labor Standards on the Global Economy, 28 SUFFOLK 
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adopted 1948 Havana Charter for the never-created International Trade Organization.38 The 
Havana Charter contained a clause mandating “fair labour standards” and providing for a dispute 
settlement mechanism to adjudicate complaints that a member state’s labor standards are 
insufficient.39 Throughout the history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
there have been many proposals (often from the United States) for multilateral trade/labor linkage, 
but no such proposal succeeded.40 
That being said, individual countries “unilaterally” linked trade status to respect for some 
labor standards throughout the period. For example, in 1984, the United States’ Generalized 
System of Preferences was amended to require conformity with a series of “internationally 
recognized workers’ rights” in order to enjoy beneficial tariff treatment for exports, and the U.S. 
has obtained inclusion of such clauses in many of its bilateral trade agreements, as well as in the 
North American Free Trade Agreement.41 There have been many other unilateral trade/labor 
linkages, by countries as diverse as Cuba, Czechoslovakia and the United Kingdom, throughout 
the 20th century.42 
This was the historical background against which, during the 1986–1994 Uruguay round of 
negotiations, US and EU representatives pushed for a WTO trade/labor linkage and failed in the 
face of developing country opposition.43 WTO Member state representatives then met for the 1996 
Ministerial Conference in Singapore, where the agenda for the new organization was to be 
operationalized. A proposition was submitted to require members of the WTO to comply with 
seven ILO conventions covering four labor standards (those that would become the ILO “core 
labor rights”): freedom of association and collective bargaining, the prohibition of child labor and 
forced labor as well as equality rights at work.44 The proposition was defeated, and the Conference 
adopted the following epoch-making statement as part of the Singapore Declaration: 
We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labour 
standards. The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal 
with these standards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting them. We believe 
that economic growth and development fostered by increased trade and further trade 
liberalization contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of labour 
standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, 
                                                 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 243, 244 (2005). 
38 MAUPAIN, supra note 18, at 127. 
39 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Nov. 21, 1947 – March 24, 1948, Final Act 
and Related Documents, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78, art. 5 & 
art. 7 (Apr. 1948). 
40 MAUPAIN, supra note 18, at 574. 
41 See generally Lance Compa, From Chile to Vietnam: International Labour Law and Workers’ Rights in 
International Trade, in CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: LIBER AMICORUM DAVID M. 
TRUBEK 143 (Gráinne de Búrca, Claire Kilpatrick & Joanne Scott, eds., 2014) [hereinafter CRITICAL LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES]. 
42 Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labor Standards on the World Trading System: A Historical 
Overview, 126 INT’L LAB. REV. 565, 569 (1987). 
43 See generally Peter Watson, The Framework for the New Trade Agenda, 25 LAW & POL’Y. INT’L BUS. 1237, 1252, 
1255, 1257 (1994). 
44 Rorden Wilkinson & Steve Hughes, Labor Standards and Global Governance: Examining the Dimensions of 
Institutional Engagement, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 259, 261 (2000). 
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particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into question. In this regard, 
we note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will continue their existing collaboration.45 
This was to be a decisive nail in the coffin of trade/labor linkage in the WTO. Yet, the lead-
up to 1996 had generated such scholarly and political interest that linkage advocates and opponents 
have continued to debate each other beyond 1996, up to today. Evidence that pressures for 
trade/labor linkage did not go away can be found in the fact that some WTO member states thought 
it appropriate to “reaffirm” the 1996 statement in the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration46 and that 
the WTO Director-General did the same thing in a 2002 speech at the ILO.47 Of course, along with 
scholarly and technocratic interest came northern social movements, which have maintained a 
vigorous campaign in favor of trade/labor linkage well beyond the 1990s.48 This undoubtedly also 
contributed to keeping the issue on the agenda. As we will see, the debates concern both the very 
desirability of linking trade and labor, as well as the determination of which labor standards should 
and should not be linked to trade law. There is a spectrum of views one can take on this issue, from 
very broad (left-wing) proposals to link many labor standards to (right-wing) views that either 
oppose linkage or only accept it for a select few labor standards. Whether human rights, 
neoliberalism and social legal thought tend to converge on this issue is one of the questions I 
address in this article. 
B. The 1998 Declaration and Core Labor Rights 
It is generally accepted that the idea of “core labor rights” (CLR) originates in the consensus 
generated by the WTO’s renvoi of the issue to the ILO in the above-quoted 1996 Singapore 
Ministerial Declaration, as well as in the Program of Action adopted at the 1995 U.N. World 
Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, which explicitly embraced what would become 
the four CLR.49 Other important origins include the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) 1996 and 2000 reports on the economic impact of labor standards, which 
already used the idea of “core” rights to refer to freedom of association, child labor, forced labor 
and non-discrimination.50 
Whatever the exact genesis, it is clear that by 1996 a strong consensus existed among various 
                                                 
45 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, SINGAPORE MINISTERIAL DECLARATION, (Dec. 13 1996) 
(WT/MIN(96)/DEC), art. 4, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm. 
46 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION, (Nov. 14, 2001) (WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1) (“We reaffirm our declaration made at the Singapore Ministerial Conference regarding 
internationally recognized core labour standards. We take note of work under way in the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) on the social dimension of globalization.”). 
47 Mike Moore, then WTO Director-General, said the following: 
I’m sure members would like me to reiterate the WTO’s commitment to the observance of internationally 
recognized labour standards, and of course, our belief that the ILO is the competent body to deal with these 
standards. As you are all aware, the WTO provides an agreed set of rules for the orderly conduct of trade between 
its members, allowing them to efficiently enhance and reap the gains from trade. This is, and will remain, our core 
business. 
Mike Moore, How Trade Liberalisation Impacts Employment: Speech to the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
(Geneva, 18 March 2002), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm80_e.htm. 
48 See LANG, supra note 32, at 81. 
49 See Alston, supra note 10, at 465–66. 
50 See KAUFMANN, supra note 26, at 70. For discussion of these reports, see infra notes 158–68 and accompanying 
text. 
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international organizations on the definition of the “core labor standards”51 and what they should 
include, and that consensus fed into the trade/labor linkage polemic.52 Still, it took work to build 
sufficient internal support in the ILO in favor of prioritizing certain labor standards. It is reported 
that the United States ILO representatives were a primordial force in the lead-up to the adoption 
of the 1998 Declaration.53 But influential critiques of the ILO’s standard-setting activities and their 
purported ineffectiveness must also have had an influence in garnering support for a “refocusing” 
of ILO activities through the adoption of CLR.54 
This brings us to the internal discussions around the adoption of the 1998 Declaration in the 
ILO’s “tripartite” International Labour Conference, a decision-making body composed of 
representatives of national employers, unions and governments.55 There, ILO Director-General 
Michel Hansenne, the Declaration’s main proponent, had to defend the idea of making certain 
standards (or, rather, the “principles” they embody) universally binding regardless of ratification 
of the underlying conventions dealing with these standards. On this last point, the employer and 
government groups in the International Labour Conference were initially reluctant.56 Hansenne 
also had to reassure the workers’ representatives group that prioritization of certain standards 
would not undermine the corpus of conventions and the ILO’s “standard-setting” activities.57 The 
Declaration was then adopted in June 1998, but the choice of the four core labor rights continued 
to be debated way beyond that date, up to today, by both critics and defenders of the shift to CLR. 
The debates often relate to the choice of labor standards to prioritize, with the left valuing many 
labor standards and often being hostile to the idea of a narrow “core” and the right defending the 
selection of a few “core” rights as principled and/or economically justified. 
C. The Decent Work Agenda and the 2008 Declaration in the ILO 
In 1999, the newly appointed ILO Director-General, Juan Somavia, proposed the “Decent 
Work Agenda.” Introduced as encompassing the four prongs/pillars of (1) “employment 
[creation],” (2) “rights at work,” (3) “social dialogue” and (4) “social protection,”58 the concept is 
                                                 
51 I will seldom use the expression “core labor standards,” which is more frequent than “core labor rights” but which 
I find does not capture the distinction many actors have tried to draw between the core rights and non-core standards. 
52 Walker reported already in 1996 that there had emerged a consensus that discussion of labor standards globally 
should focus only on the four CLR. Paul Walker, Social Clauses in International Trade: The Debate in the European 
Union, 30: 4 J. WORLD TRADE 25, 36–39 (1996). 
53 Alston, supra note 10, at 466–69. 
54 Some of these critiques from ILO insiders focused on the “overproduction” of irrelevant labor standards. E.g., Efren 
Cordova, Some Reflections on the Over-Production of International Labour Standards, 14 COMP. LAB. L. 138, 139 
(1993). Others advocated the selection of a “core” set of labor standards for the ILO to promote as human rights 
(ironically given his ulterior critique of the 1998 Declaration). See Philip Alston, Post-Post-Modernism and 
International Labour Standards: The Quest for a New Complexity, in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS AND 
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 95, 102 (Werner Sengenberger & Duncan Campbell, eds., 1994). On the role of such 
criticism in the genesis of the 1998 Declaration, see HUGHES & HAWORTH, supra note 33, at 47–51. 
55 For more background on this aspect of the ILO’s structure, see GERRY RODGERS ET AL., THE ILO AND THE QUEST 
FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, 1919–2009 15–17 (2009). 
56 Vidy Kumar, Rethinking the Convergence of Human Rights and Labour Rights in International Law: 
Depoliticizsation and Excess, in LAW IN TRANSITION: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
127, 135–36 (Ruth Buchanan & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2014); see also HUGHES & HAWORTH, supra note 33, at 50–
51. 
57 See HUGHES & HAWORTH, supra note 33, at 51. 
58 See ILO, Report of the Director-General: Decent Work (International Labour Conference, 87th Session, Geneva, 
June 1999), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc87/rep-i.htm. 
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said to have been partly motivated by a concern that “the traditional ILO approach of standard-
setting was too much driven by developed world country agendas.”59 The idea was to move away 
from strict standard-setting towards technical assistance in the Global South60 and to focus on all 
forms of “work” rather than formal “labor” markets in order to be more relevant to Southern 
economies marked by labor market informality.61 But the DWA was also clearly intended to play 
a substantive programmatic role, that of “consolidating” existing ILO activities and remarketing 
them under new vocabularies and concepts.62 The crucial question then becomes how to frame the 
relationship between the Decent Work Agenda and existing labor standard conventions, as well as 
the 1998 Declaration. Debates on that question are what I address at length below as I track the 
arguments made throughout the years on the content and meaning of the Decent Work Agenda. 
The last event in my period of 1994–2008 is the adoption of the ILO’s 2008 Declaration on 
Social Justice for a Fair Globalization (2008 Declaration). It is reported that the 2008 Declaration 
was put forward by Director General Somavia out of fears of a “potential negative impact of [the 
2008] recession on the Decent Work initiative”.63 The 2008 Declaration gave “constitutional” 
imprimatur to the Decent Work Agenda, up to then a mere programmatic set of slogans unilaterally 
adopted by the Director-General and which had not been formally adopted by the tripartite 
International Labour Conference, the ILO’s “parliament”. The 2008 Declaration did so by formally 
adopting a statement to the effect that “the commitments and efforts of Members and the 
Organization to implement the ILO’s constitutional mandate, including through international 
labour standards”, “should be based on the . . . Decent Work Agenda”.64 The debates I analyze 
concern the relationship between the core labor rights and the other pillars of the Decent Work 
Agenda. For some, the “core” rights need to be given pre-eminence within the DWA structure, 
while for others the four pillars should be equally prioritized, such that, say, measures of “social 
protection” are no less important than the fight against forced labor. The latter position is more 
left-wing and the former is more right-wing, as they respectively favor a more ambitious and a 
more restrictive agenda for international labor standards promotion. 
The period of 1994–2008 thus ended with the ILO having substantially modified its normative 
documents and machinery, in addition to having arguably been thrown at the center of international 
disputes on the regulation of work, thereby influencing a raft of other institutions and settings. 
Given this influence, it is important to track ILO debates on labor standards and read them together 
with discussions from other forum such as the WTO to assess how they have influenced our current 
historical and intellectual condition and how they might affect future policy discussions. I now 
proceed with my analysis of the three approaches and their ideological valences in the ILO and 
WTO debates from 1994 to 2008. 
                                                 
59 HUGHES & HAWORTH, supra note 33, at 75. 
60 Id. 
61 Standing, supra note 9, at 370. 
62 JEAN-MICHEL SERVAIS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (ILO) 33 (2011); SUPRIYA ROUTH, ENHANCING 
CAPABILITIES THROUGH LABOUR LAW: INFORMAL WORKERS IN INDIA 120–21 (2014); HUGHES & HAWORTH, supra 
note 33, at 78–79. 
63 Bellace, supra note 15, at 22–23. 
64 ILO, Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, (97th Session, Geneva, 10 June 2008) 
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/mission-and-objectives/WCMS_099766/lang--
en/index.htm [hereinafter 2008 Declaration]. 
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II. NEOLIBERAL ARGUMENTS 
This part presents the arguments relying on a neoliberal language across the three debates 
with which I am concerned, namely the trade/labor linkage controversy, the core labor rights 
(CLR) polemic pertaining to the ILO’s aforementioned 1998 Declaration and exchanges on the 
ILO’s Decent Work Agenda and the place of the core labor rights in that broader scheme. But first, 
it presents a definition of what I mean by neoliberalism. 
A. A Definition of Neoliberalism 
“Neoliberalism” is a word often used to describe a new policy approach that rose to 
considerable influence in the 1970s in many national governments as well as in international 
organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD, among others. One important 
definitional point is the distinction between neoliberalism and classical liberalism, as it is broadly 
accepted that neoliberalism historically entailed both a revival of classical liberalism and new 
innovations.65 
Classical liberalism, often referred to as “classical legal thought” in the legal context,66 is said 
to have been intensely preoccupied with “the distinction between public and private law,” the goal 
being to “establish a separate, ‘natural’ realm of non-coercive and non-political transactions free 
from the dangers of state interference and redistribution.”67 An important part of the grammar of 
classical liberalism was the “will theory,” which entailed that “the private law rules of the 
‘advanced’ Western nation states were well understood as a set of rational derivations from the 
notion that government should help individuals realize their wills, restrained only as necessary to 
permit others to do the same.”68 It has been argued that this trait, combined with the idea of wills 
as “powers absolute within their spheres,” fueled classical liberalism and the infamous laissez-
faire orientation of some of its proponents.69 For classical jurists, the will theory was definitional 
of “law” and opposed to “morality,” meaning duties towards the other (and oneself) beyond not 
intruding on the other’s own sphere of private will (e.g. duties to share and redistribute wealth). 
I think this frame is the one that drove developments like the infamous Lochner v. New York 
case, for many a symbol of classical liberalism’s laissez-faire version,70 where one finds statements 
like that according to which workers should not benefit from legislative labor standards because 
they “are in no sense wards of the State” and “are . . . able to assert their rights and care for 
themselves without the protecting arm of the State, interfering with their independence of 
judgment and of action.”71 The idea is that duties of loving care toward oneself or the other, when 
they are not concerned with infringement on others’ sphere of absolute freedom, are legally 
unenforceable and cannot be legislated. 
                                                 
65 David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 
(2014). 
66 See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT x–xi (2006). 
67 MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 11 
(1992). 
68 Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formalism, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 
8634, 8635 (2001). 
69 Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 26–28 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, eds., 2006). 
70 See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 67, at 29–30 (discussing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
71 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57. 
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By contrast, in neoliberalism, the goal of efficiency is clearly stated, and there is no discussion 
of duties of care towards the other being unenforceable as a matter of legal logic. Rather, the tone 
used by institutions like the IMF is more institutionalist, with talk of “changing the institutional 
framework” in order to increase “competition and price flexibility.” 72 The famous legal 
implications of this economic outlook have been summed up by David Kennedy as follows: “the 
private law regimes necessary to support market transactions should be strengthened, while the 
public law regulations and bureaucratic procedures that impeded private exchange were 
dismantled.”73 Often associated with this is the idea that labor market “regulation” creates 
unemployment and hurts workers by impeding growth and distorting labor markets.74 This trope 
is central to neoliberalism as it is used in the debates I analyze. One of its underlying ideas is that 
“free market” private law is good because it prevents workers from “restricting supply” in the labor 
market in order to capture “rents” that decrease economic output.75 
Kerry Rittich, in her seminal mapping of the IMF and World Bank’s discourse on employment 
during the 1990s, proposed that there lies at the heart of neoliberal discourse an idea of “normal 
markets,” deviation from which is depicted as harmful, and that normality is alternatively defined 
as the status quo in (certain) developed countries, or as a model to which all states should aspire.76 
Additional costs imposed beyond bargains resulting from the normal free market are often modeled 
as leading to “deadweight loss” for society, i.e. to decreased economic activity due to higher costs 
than normal.77 
“Normality” is also defined as a legal regime (of employment at will and freedom of contract) 
that allows employers to “bid wages to whatever level enables them to get an amount of labor that 
can be put to profitable use.”78 Other images used to describe this normal market include the idea 
that pure freedom of contract allows parties to maintain a “link between pay and performance,”79 
thereby providing incentives for superior performance. Another trope of the discourse is that free 
market law allows wages to reflect the productivity of workers and that wages will rise as 
                                                 
72 Kerry Rittich, Rights, Risk and Reward: Governance Norms in the International Order and the Problem of 
Precarious Work, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN, AND THE NEW ECONOMY: THE CHALLENGE TO LEGAL NORMS 31, 
33 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens eds., 2006) (quoting INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC 
OUTLOOK APRIL 2004: ADVANCING STRUCTURAL REFORMS 104–05 (2004)). 
73 David Kennedy, The ‘Rule of Law,’ Political Choices and Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 69, at 95, 132. 
74 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK MAY 1999: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
CONTAGION 99–100 (1999); see generally JAMES ATLESON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON WORKER’S RIGHTS 268 (2006), for a more general account of the implications of neoliberalism for 
labor markets. 
75 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK APRIL 2003: GROWTH AND INSTITUTIONS 144 
(2003). 
76 KERRY RITTICH, RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING: LAW, DISTRIBUTION AND GENDER IN MARKET REFORM 93 
(2002). 
77 See Brishen Rogers, Justice at Work: Minimum Wage Laws and Social Equality, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1543, 1551 (2014), 
for further discussion. 
78 THE LABOUR LAW CASEBOOK GROUP, LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 
24–25 (8th ed. 2011) (quoting ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 409 (3d ed. 
1972)). 
79 RITTICH, supra note 76, at 82 (quoting WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1991: THE CHALLENGE 
OF DEVELOPMENT 79 (1991)). 
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productivity itself rises.80 “Flexibility” is another word often used to describe such a regime.81 
Moreover, in the context of debates about trade law, it is asserted that any employment regulation 
that imposes costs beyond the “normal” market will lower the comparative advantage of the 
targeted country, thereby creating a global deadweight loss as well as a local loss of opportunities 
for growth and higher wages.82 
It is apparent that neoliberals often define the “normal” market as a regime of “absolute” 
property and contract rights,83 notions that strongly evoke classical liberalism. Traces of this 
appear in the 1994–2008 labor standards debates, where some actors are unwilling to accept any 
labor standard promotion that goes beyond what the free market generates.84 Yet, there is more 
than this to both the 1994–2008 discussions and neoliberalism more broadly. 
First, neoliberalism is more often preoccupied with labor costs (and efficiency), and not with 
individual freedom understood as the overarching goal. Hence, many neoliberals are willing to 
compromise on certain labor standards, which they perceive to impose no additional costs on 
employers.85 Moreover, proponents of neoliberalism are very much willing to discuss market 
failures, defined as “an outcome deriving from the self-interested behavior of individuals . . . in 
which economic efficiency does not result”86 because of market “defects” like informational 
deficiencies or transaction costs. For neoliberalism the concern for market failures is often counter-
balanced by fear of government failure, which may lead “regulation” to fail to correct market 
failures and even worsen the problem.87 Nevertheless, in my own set of arguments from 1994–
2008, market failures are often accepted as making some labor standards legitimate. In particular, 
prisoner’s dilemmas that create incentives that block the adoption of standards that are efficiency-
enhancing in the long-term figure heavily in the arguments.88 Thus, neoliberal modeling of 
“efficient” legal rules only indirectly depends on classical liberal views and does not hesitate to 
accept labor “regulation” and sacrifice individual freedom when it does not lead to efficiency. 
I now turn to the way in which neoliberalism was used in the 1994–2008 debates. As with all 
three languages, an important part of my argument is that there is homology between neoliberal 
claims made across the three disputes. That is to say that, for instance, arguments made against 
trade/labor linkage are also used to limit labor standards promotion in the ILO context (by 
portraying non-core labor standards as efficiency-impairing or as hurting workers by reducing 
employment). Neoliberal discourse, however, seems somewhat politically indeterminate, less so 
than human rights but a lot more than social legal thought in the context of my three debates. That 
is to say that neoliberalism is very often right-wing, i.e. used to oppose any labor standard 
promotion to supplement or reverse the outcomes of the “free market,” but that it can also 
                                                 
80 See infra notes 143–49 and accompanying text. 
81 See, e.g., Richard B Freeman, Labour Market Institutions Without Blinders: The Debate over Flexibility and Labour 
Market Performance, 19 INT’L ECON. J. 129, 131–32 (2005); Guy Standing, Globalization, Labour Flexibility and 
Insecurity: The Era of Market Regulation, 3:1 EUR. J. OF INDUS. REL. 7 (1997). 
82 See infra Part II.b. This sometimes leads to neoliberal claims that the resources for the “enjoyment of human rights” 
can be supplied most efficiently through “liberal trade promoting welfare.” See Petersmann, supra note 18, at 621–
22. 
83 RITTICH, supra note 76, at 72. 
84 See infra Part II.b. 
85 See infra notes 184–85 and accompanying text. 
86 Market failure, THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (8th ed. 2011). 
87 See generally Anne O. Krueger, Government Failures in Development, 4:3 J. ECON. PERSP. 9 (1990), for the classic 
statement of this idea. 
88 See, e.g., infra notes 188–97 and accompanying text. 
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sometimes be moderately left-wing. Hence, we will see that the intellectual apparatus used to argue 
against linkage sometimes leads neoliberals to model certain labor standards as efficiency-
enhancing and therefore to adopt the more left-wing position of accepting some international labor 
standards promotion. This analysis is the first step in my study of potential ideological convergence 
between neoliberalism and other discourses, including human rights. 
B. Neoliberal Arguments on Trade/Labor Linkage 
I start with neoliberal arguments on trade/labor linkage. It seems fair to say that the bulk of 
the arguments against linkage were articulated in the language of neoliberalism. One extremely 
common trope is that promoting labor standards through trade law mechanisms like sanctions will 
hurt targeted countries economically and make the workers concerned worse off. Robert Howse 
and Michael Trebilcock, in a widely-read book on international trade, put the point as follows: 
Trade restrictions raise the prices of imports, thus imposing a welfare cost at home, while 
at the same time worsening the labor situation in the target country. Demand for labor services 
will fall, and plants will downsize or close. Trade sanctions are akin to a tax on employment 
of low-skilled workers. Using trade remedies to enforce labor standards would worsen the 
problems at which they are aimed (by forcing workers in targeted countries into informal or 
illegal activities). Unemployment will rise, and given the absence or weakness of social safety 
nets (unemployment insurance), can be expected to have a detrimental impact on poverty.89 
This argument is sometimes taken further and used to designate developed countries’ labor 
standards as the problem. Indeed, for some, it is the fact that the North imposes “distortionary” 
labor standards to its import-competing sectors that creates the need for protectionist imposition 
of labor standards on the Global South, in order to “alleviat[e] the distortion caused by the 
industrial bloc’s own labour standard[s].”90 
Another related claim of neoliberal opponents of linkage is that imposing labor standards on 
developing countries would rob them of their comparative trade advantage, and that “fair trade” 
or “social dumping”91 are intellectually incoherent bases on which to do so. Arvind Panagariya, 
Columbia economics professor and ex-Chief Economist at the Asian Development Bank, makes 
such an argument in an article in which he rejects any trade/labor linkage: 
                                                 
89 MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 451 (3rd ed. 2005); see 
also Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, What You Should Know About Globalization and the World Trade 
Organization, 10: 3 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 404, 416–17 (2002). On child labor, see also T.N. 
Srinivasan, International Labor Standards Once Again!, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS AND GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM 34, 37 (United States Department of Labor ed., 1994) 
(stating that the “proscription of [child] labour, if strictly enforced without compensation, would lower family welfare 
of those who are already desperately poor”). The point is often made that it is because demand for low-skilled labor 
(the kind of labor employed in industries where labor standards are most often violated) is very price-elastic that higher 
labor standards directly translate into higher unemployment. See, e.g., Pietra Rivoli, Labor Standards in the Global 
Economy: Issues for Investors, 43:3 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 223, 230 (2003)). Others further distinguish between “industries 
where asset specificity is minimal and labor costs are an important component of production” and sectors who lack 
these characteristics, arguing that only in the former might labor standards be a serious concern. See Daniel Drezner, 
Globalization and Policy Convergence, 3:1 INT’L STUD. 53, 78 (2001). 
90 Murshed, S. Mansoob, Perspectives on Two Phases of Globalisation, in GLOBALIZATION, MARGINALIZATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 1, 17 (2002); see also Christopher McCrudden & Anne Davies, A Perspective on Trade and Labour 
Rights, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 43, 52 (2000) (suggesting that northern “domestic laws” relating to “labor rights” may 
“conflict with WTO rules” because they make it “more difficult for market penetration to take place”). 
91 See infra Part IV for an exploration of these arguments. 
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Virtually every textbook on international trade describes the pauper labor [“social 
dumping”] argument as a common fallacy. The simple point is that high wage countries are 
perfectly capable of competing against low wage countries due to their higher productivity. 
What they cannot do is to compete against the latter in goods in which they have a comparative 
disadvantage . . . . The very essence of the gains from trade is that due to differences in 
underlying fundamentals, countries differ in their abilities to produce different products. 
Developing countries have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods and developed 
countries in capital- and technology-intensive goods.92 
Accordingly, opponents of linkage have often argued that conceiving of trade comparative 
advantage as in any way conditioned by social or labor policies (and therefore as “fair” or “unfair”) 
is a “Pandora’s Box” that could lead any country to be considered an unfair trader.93 The idea is 
that consideration of social policies is too “indeterminate”94 to have any place in trade discourse. 
Existing social policies (or lack thereof) must be considered “part and parcel or comparative 
advantage.”95 A related idea often used to oppose trade/labor linkage is that “wages reflect the 
supply of and demand for workers in a particular labor market, and the marginal revenue product 
of workers in that market,”96 such that better working conditions in the Global South can only be 
achieved by “free market”-led development, leading to “higher value-added manufacturing and 
services, which are higher-wage industries”.97 
There is a direct link between that argument and the Kuznets curve theory, which posits that 
“income inequality initially worsens as per capita GNP rises, peaking at intermediate income levels 
and declining for industrial countries.”98 This view that low labor standards grant labor-abundant 
countries a comparative advantage that helps them develop and climb along the Kuznets curve to 
ever-higher standards of living can be traced back to David Hume.99 The implications drawn from 
                                                 
92 Arvind Panagariya, Labor Standards and Trade Sanctions: Right End, Wrong Means, in THE IMPACT OF TRADE ON 
LABOR: ISSUES, PERSPECTIVES, AND EXPERIENCES FROM DEVELOPING ASIA 141, 146–47 (Rana Hasan & Devashish 
Mitra eds., 2003). 
93 JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK 21 (1991). 
94 Michael Trebilcock, Trade Policy and Labour Standards: Objectives, Instruments and Institutions, in HARD 
CHOICES, SOFT LAW 170, 172 (John Kirton & Michael Trebilcock eds., 2004). 
95 Robert Howse & Michael Trebilcock, The Fair Trade/Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labour, and the Environment, 16 
INT’L REV. OF LAW AND ECON. 61, 74 (1996) (asking, “[a]ssuming there is nothing wrongful with another country’s 
environmental or labour policies[,] . . . then why should a cost advantage attributable to these divergent policies not 
be treated like any other cost advantage, i.e. as part and parcel or comparative advantage?”). 
96 Bhala, supra note 33, at 21 (citing PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 220–21 (15th ed. 
1995)). 
97 Bhala, supra note 33, at 22. 
98 Bernhard G. Gunter & Rolph van der Hoeven, The Social Dimension of Globalization: A Review of the Literature, 
143 INTN’L LABOUR REV. 7, 21 (2004); see also Jeffrey A. Frankel, Globalization of the Economy, in GOVERNANCE 
IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 45, 73 (Joseph S. Nye & John D. Donahue eds., 2000). 
99 As put by Hume: 
When one nation has gotten the start of another in trade, it is very difficult for the latter to regain the ground 
it has lost because of the superior industry and skill of the former. … But these advantages are compensated in 
some measure, by the low price of labor in every nation which has not had an extensive commerce… Manufacturers 
therefore gradually shift their places, leaving those countries and provinces which they have already enriched, and 
flying to others, whither they are allured by the cheapness of provisions and labor, till they have enriched those 
also, and are again banished by the same cause . . . . 
DAVID HUME, ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 281 (Liberty Fund Inc. 2012); see also Panagariya, supra 
note 93, at 148 (“The changes in marginal benefits and costs of labor standards, for example, due to changes in income 
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this argument are that “tampering with free trade by imposing non-market wage rates will impede 
this process”100 by robbing countries of the comparative advantage necessary for development.101 
This is the background idea to the frequent claim that the level of appropriate or attainable labor 
standards protection depends on a country’s level of development.102 
Interestingly, ILO Director-General Michel Hansenne took up the same idea in his epochal 
report to the 1994 International Labour Conference (which is widely considered to have been a 
crucial intervention contributing to the acceptance of the idea of core labor rights in the ILO 
context).103 Hansenne, exploring the question of how to “improve compliance with our basic 
standards by somehow changing the underlying philosophy of our supervisory system,”104 rejects 
the idea that the ILO should “advocate either restrictions to trade or a compulsory equalization of 
social costs.”105 Trade/labor linkage would be wrong, according to Hansenne, because “freer trade 
is to be sought for its potential to spur economic development, and thereby to improve the 
conditions of life and work and create jobs.”106 
Rather, according to Hansenne, the ILO must, through “cooperation rather than coercion,”107 
examine “whether the States concerned are taking sufficient measures to examine the possibility 
of ratifying ILO standards . . . to the extent their situation and means allow, and, in particular, to 
the extent made possible by the economic growth resulting from the relaxation or removal of trade 
barriers.”108 “No one else, not even the Organization itself, can decide for each ILO Member” the 
                                                 
or productivity in ‘supplying’ labor standards, cause optimal labor standards to vary over time as well as across 
nations.”). 
100 Bhala, supra note 33, at 23. 
101 Id. at 22. For similar arguments, see Alan O. Sykes, International Trade and Human Rights: An Economic 
Perspective 4 (University of Chicago Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 188 (2nd Series), 
2003), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/188.aos_.human-rights.pdf (“[R]ising real incomes and greater 
openness to trade tends to promote human rights”); Robert M. Stern & Katherine Terrell, Labor Standards and the 
World Trade Organization 7 & 9 (The University of Michigan, Gerald R. Ford Sch. of Public Policy, Discussion Paper 
No. 499,2003, http://fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers476-500/r499.pdf (since “workers may suffer 
negative consequences when their wages are raised above the market value of their productivity,”, the only way to 
improve working conditions in poor countries is to “continue the many existing economic and social development 
efforts,” i.e. trade liberalization and conventional development policies). There is a strong analogy to claims famously 
made by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann that the resources for the “enjoyment of human rights” can be supplied most 
efficiently through “liberal trade promoting welfare.” Petersmann, supra note 18, at 621–22. 
102 See Drusilla K. Brown et al., International Labor Standards and Trade: A Theoretical Analysis, in FAIR TRADE 
AND HARMONIZATION 227, 230 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) (“[T]he choice of labor standards 
may depend on a country’s stage of development and per capita income.”); BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL 
TRADE 66 (2005) (CLR must be interpreted “so as to take account of the level of socio-economic development in each 
country.”); HUGHES & HAWORTH, supra note 33, at 63 (“[T]he promotion and encouragements model at the heart of 
Hansenne’s strategic shift in ILO focus in the 1990s” [leading to the 1998 Declaration] “recognizes flexibility in the 
pace and scope of standard-setting, appropriate to different stages in development.”). 
103 HUGHES AND HAWORTH, supra note 33, at 46. 
104 ILO, International Labour Conference, 81st Session, at 7–24, Defending Values, Promoting Change: Report of the 
Director-General 51 (June 1994). 
105 Id. at 58. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 59–60. Hansenne reiterated that point in his 1997 report to the International Labour Conference: 
Differences in conditions and levels of [labor standards] protection are linked to a certain extent to differences 
in levels of development. Denying developing countries the advantages (relative and transitory) which ensue from 
these differences would be tantamount to denying them a share in the profits of globalization and, by extension, 
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policies to be adopted, “subject only to two sets of minimal conditions:” respect for on the one 
hand freedom of association and “tripartism” and on the other hand “basic standards which, 
regardless of national priorities, seem inseparable from any pursuit of social progress.”109 This 
second category of unassailable minimum standards, composed of “certain minimum provisions 
in the field of social security,” turns out to be mandatory only “in proportion to local costs, and to 
the extent that such protection can be financed out of the additional wealth generated by the growth 
of trade.”110 Having laid out a rule in favor of subordinating labor standards to growth through 
“free trade,” the Director-General establishes some exceptions, freedom of association and “basic 
social security,” only to reintroduce the sine qua non of growth through liberalization inside the 
exception. 
The arguments explored so far all oppose the very idea of linking trade and labor standards. 
While the case in favor of trade/labor linkage has often been made, against the above arguments, 
in the languages of human rights and social legal thought, there have been counter-arguments in 
the language of neoliberalism, to which I now turn. The elaboration of the category of core labor 
rights (CLR) has been centrally important to the construction of these arguments. As I describe 
below, not only did ILO actors use neoliberal arguments to defend the project of CLR as an ILO 
legal mechanism, but scholars and institutions outside the ILO articulated neoliberal arguments to 
exempt the four CLR from the case against trade/labor linkage. This leads to a disaggregation of 
neoliberal anti-linkage arguments whereby the harmful characteristics typically attributed to all 
labor standards are projected only onto non-core labor standards. This is an instance of a move to 
the left, i.e. in the direction of more labor standards promotion. 
The economic case in favor of CLR was to a large extent pioneered by the OECD in two 
studies from 1996 and 2000. These purported to show conceptually and empirically that a 
correlation can be established between economic performance and respect for core labor rights.111 
In fact, however, the 1996 OECD report presents a tricky argument, which deals as much with the 
causal link between trade and better labor standards as the reverse. It does state: “it is conceivable 
that the observance of core standards would strengthen the long-term economic performance of all 
countries.”112 But the reverse is also true, according to the OECD. That is, “[t]he more successful 
                                                 
the possibility of subsequent social development; 
ILO, International Labour Conference, 85th Session, The Standard Setting and Globalization: Report of the Director-
General (June 1997), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc85/dg-rep.htm. 
109 Id. at 60. 
110 Id. at 60–61. 
111 See OECD, TRADE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKER’S RIGHTS AND LABOUR 
STANDARDS (1996) [hereinafter OECD, TRADE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDXS]; OECD, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE AND CORE LABOUR STANDARDS (2000). For discussion, see ATLESON ET AL., supra note 74, at 252; 
KAUFMANN, supra note 26, at 152. Despite its influence, the OECD’s case for core labor rights is quite contested and 
unstable. Indeed, several analysts have criticized the evidence put forward in the 1996 and 2000 reports. See Steve 
Charnovitz, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and Recent Developments in the Trade and 
Labour Standards Debate, 11 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP L.J. 131, (1997); Lance Compa, Assessing Assessments: A 
Survey of Efforts to Measure Countries’ Compliance with Freedom of Association Standards, 24 COM. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 283 (2003). 
112 OECD, TRADE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 111, at 105. It is interesting to note that this 
finding, in addition to being used to argue in favor of some linkage/promotion of CLR in ways I catalogue in this part, 
is also used to argue against labor standards promotion and linkage, as a refutation of “social dumping” arguments of 
unfair trade advantage. The argument is that if low labor standards do not raise comparative advantage, southern 
countries do not gain from their low labor standards and should not have a social clause imposed on them through 
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the trade reform in terms of the degree of trade liberalization achieved, the greater is the respect of 
association rights in the country.”113 There is thus a “mutually supportive relationship”114 between 
trade liberalization and core labor rights in general and collective bargaining rights in particular. 
On the positive economic impact of core labor rights, the OECD argues that anti-
discrimination rights “might raise economic efficiency by ensuring that the allocation of labour 
resources moves closer to a free market situation.”115 Eliminating forced labor “can also contribute 
to improving allocative efficiency.”116 Finally, “child labor exploitation” can be targeted by labor 
standards because it “is likely to undermine long-term economic prospects to the extent that it 
hampers children’s education possibilities and degrades their health and welfare.”117 As for 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, their economic impact “depends on 
a variety of factors:” 
On the one hand, these rights can help upgrade production processes, while also raising 
workers’ motivation and productivity. On the other hand, they can introduce a new distortion 
in the market if unionised workers succeed in raising their wages and working conditions above 
market levels. The net outcome on economic efficiency depends on the relative importance of 
these two effects.118 
The OECD 1996 report established this normative unease with collective bargaining, which 
was to mark many subsequent economic arguments for labor standards.119 Nevertheless, it is often 
claimed that the additional empirical evidence provided by the follow-up 2000 OECD report 
dissipated these doubts, leading to a solidification of the economic case for all four CLR.120 
The OECD’s pioneering arguments, in addition to helping elaborate the CLR category in the 
first place, inspired some pro-linkage neoliberal arguments. Many of these arguments have been 
published after the 1998 Declaration, seemingly relying on the new consensus on the importance 
of promoting CLR. Rather than painting CLR as downright efficiency enhancing, these accounts 
often cautiously claim that efficiency-neutrality and mere consistency with trade law can be 
achieved. These arguments often appeal to notions of individual freedom said to drive or animate 
CLR. As put by Christopher McCrudden and Anne Davies: 
Claims that there is a positive synergy between trade and rights are, at best, unproven. But 
this leaves the more modest argument that some fundamental workers’ rights can be pursued 
without harming trade . . . . There is a clear attempt [in the 1998 Declaration] to lessen the 
accusation of protectionism and the erosion of comparative advantage in the choice of these 
“core” rights . . . . [T]hese rights may be seen as rights to a process, not rights to a particular 
                                                 
trade sanctions; see K.D. Raju, Social Clause in WTO and Core ILO Labour Standards: Concerns of India and Other 
Developing Countries, in BEYOND THE TRANSITION PHASE OF WTO: AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE ON EMERGING ISSUES 
313, 318 (Dipankar Sengupta, Debashis Chakraborty & Pritam Banerjee eds., 2008). 
113 Id. at 111. 
114 Id. at 112. 
115 OECD, TRADE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 111, at 11. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 11–12. 
119 See, e.g., David Charny, Regulatory Competition and the Global Coordination of Labor Standards, 3 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 281, 290–92 (2000). 
120 KAUFMANN, supra note 26, at 152; HEPPLE, supra note 102, at 15. 
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outcome (however difficult that distinction is to draw in practice). They are linked, particularly, 
by an attempt to protect freedom of choice.121 
Michael Trebilcock provides a strikingly similar take on the four core labor rights as 
“consistent” with free trade because based on “freedom of choice” and “individual well-being.”122 
This leads in his case to a much stronger advocacy of a form of “hard” international enforcement, 
through the U.N. Security Council.123 Both rationalizations present pro-linkage neoliberal 
arguments strongly rooted in classical liberal tropes of individual freedom. 
Other actors purport to go beyond the ambiguous support for freedom of association displayed 
by the OECD by affirming its positive economic impact. According to Kimberly Ann Elliot, an 
academic who became in 2011 the chair of the Department of Labor’s National Advisory 
Committee on Labor Provisions of U.S. Free Trade, there is “relatively little controversy” over 
child labor, forced labor, and discrimination. In economic terms, “the real heat” comes from 
freedom of association and collective bargaining.124 But, Elliot argues, freedom of association has 
a redeeming economic virtue, as it “can make economic reforms more acceptable and 
sustainable.”125 It does so by “address[ing] concerns of the critics”126 that “economic globalization 
today is unbalanced, disproportionately favoring capital over labor and other social groups.” 127 
Also, collective bargaining laws “are a complement to reforms to increase labor market flexibility” 
because they “enable workers to negotiate to protect their own interests, without having to resort 
to detailed, interventionist government regulation.”128 
Hence, Elliott argues that, despite being possibly economically harmful, freedom of 
association and collective bargaining can enhance the legitimacy of other (neoliberal) economic 
reforms, thereby playing an instrumentally useful, if indirect economic role. It does so not only by 
making labor flexibility reforms seem more worker-friendly, but also by deflecting worker 
militancy from “interventionist government regulation.” Elliot also adds an argument sounding in 
institutionalist “rule of law” thinking by claiming that unions constitute a “cost-effective 
mechanism for responding to the pressures from civil society for more monitoring and verification 
of labor standards, particularly in developing countries where government capacity is limited.”129 
Unions can make good governance cheaper for developing countries. 
The pattern I have uncovered so far is that neoliberal linkage arguments are generally right-
wing, and occasionally moderately left-wing. I now turn to another debate, that related to the ILO 
1998 Declaration’s “core labor rights,” to see whether neoliberal arguments follow the same 
                                                 
121 McCrudden & Davies, supra note 90, at 51–52 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
122 Trebilcock, supra note 94, at 173–74. 
123 Id. 
124 Kimberly Ann Elliott, Labor Standards and the Free Trade Area of the Americas, (Institute for International 
Economics, Working Paper No. 03-7, 2003), at 3, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=444900&download=yes. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 4. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). To the same effect, see Duncan Campbell, Labour Standards, 
Flexibility, and Economic Performance, in ADVANCING THEORY IN LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN A 
GLOBAL CONTEXT 229, 237 (Ton Wilthagen ed., 1998); Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 95, at 62. Rittich argues that 
this is a characteristic trope of IMF/World Bank arguments on the advisability of otherwise bad-for-growth 
“regulation.” RITTICH, supra note 76, at 33. 
129 Elliott, supra note 124, at 5. 
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pattern there. 
C. Neoliberal Arguments on the 1998 Declaration and Core Labor Rights 
The legitimacy and desirability of the core labor rights contained in the 1998 Declaration has 
been mainly asserted from human rights and Social perspectives, with these two constantly vying 
for predominance, as I will outline below. Nevertheless, an important number of actors also sought 
to vindicate CLR on (moderately left-wing) economic, neoliberal grounds. On one level, the 
arguments presented are fairly concrete. Specific standards like equality rights are defended on the 
basis that “equal treatment and equal opportunities improve the efficient use of human resources” 
and “improv[e] workforce morale and motivation, leading to better labour relations with positive 
implications for overall productivity.”130 Or, to take another example, it is claimed that “collective 
bargaining and tripartite dialogue are necessary elements for creating an environment that 
encourages high productivity, attracts foreign direct investments and enables the society and the 
economy to adjust to external factors such as financial crisis and natural disasters.”131 
That being said, neoliberal arguments in favor of CLR are often made at a much higher level 
of generality, tapping into the “principles” that drive CLR and make them different from non-core 
standards. As in the case of the linkage arguments above, this is often done by assimilating CLR 
to neoliberal economic reforms. ILO Director-General Michel Hansenne, in a memorandum 
submitted to the 1996 G7 Conference on Employment, spoke of “economic congruence, since 
recognition of these fundamental rights [CLR] appears to be based on the same principles as those 
underlying the international trade system itself.”132 He concluded that “the prohibition of forced 
labour and recognition of freedom of association are the prerequisites for freedom and 
transparency in the labour market and may also be seen as the natural extension of free trade in 
the world market.”133 
Brian Langille has proposed a similar rationalization of the distinctiveness of core labor rights 
as based on “a ‘market friendly’ approach” which “liberates the discussion from familiar 
controversies couched in terms of economic efficiency,” because CLR are based on the “non-
instrumental values” of “free, informed and uncoerced choice” which are “foundational to market 
theory.” 134 Christine Kaufmann provides a complementary rationale, taking up a distinction that 
will also be very important for human rights arguments, that between procedure and substance. 
Hence, the four CLR are “procedural labour rights” (as opposed to “substantive labour law”) which 
“aim to foster self-determination by essentially granting freedom of contract and thus freedom of 
choice,” with no need for “new regulations” to implement the rights. 135 
                                                 
130 ILO, 91st session, Time for Equality at Work: Report of the Director-General, Global Report under the Follow-up 
to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, at ix–x (2003), 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---
publ/documents/publication/wcms_publ_9221128717_en.pdf. 
131 ILO, 276th session, Country Studies on the Social Impact of Globalization: Final Report, ¶ 94, GB.276/WP/SDL/1, 
(Nov. 1999), http://ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb276/sdl-1.htm. 
132 ILO, supra note 18. 
133 Id. (emphasis added). 
134 Langille, supra note 18, at 242. 
135 KAUFMANN, supra note 26, at 70–71 (citations omitted). Kimberly Ann Elliott also praises the economic virtues 
of the procedural nature of freedom of association, which amounts to “principles that are universally applicable but 
that leave broad scope for national diversity in implementation” and “do not prescribe any particular set of industrial 
relations institutions.” Elliott, supra note 124, at 7; see also DAVID CHIN, A SOCIAL CLAUSE FOR LABOUR’S CAUSE: 
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Foregoing talk of “congruence” and “friendliness” does not express clearly the relationship 
between neoliberal reforms and CLR, however. It is probably safe to assume that Hansenne and 
Langille refer to the kind of “efficiency neutrality” McCrudden and Davies mentioned in the 
above-quoted excerpt.136 Under this view, provided that core labor rights are grounded in the right 
individualist overarching concepts, their economic impact can be assumed to be at the very least 
neutral. And here, Kaufmann’s addition of the process/substance distinction may be seen to 
resonate with the idea that labor standards shouldn’t impose costs on employers (substance being 
equated with costs). The idea of cost-neutrality is an important part of the defense of CLR,137 and 
it leads to the puzzling designation in certain circles of the non-core standards as “cash standards,” 
i.e. standards that cost something.138 Nevertheless, as I will argue in the human rights part, the 
process/substance distinction is not always discussed in terms of its economic impact; sometimes, 
it is related to the question of the correct and principled interpretation of a human rights corpus 
based on things like human dignity and capabilities. 
While there does seem to be a crystallized left-wing neoliberal discourse in favor of some 
promotion of the core labor rights, the neoliberal case sometimes collapses for some CLR, which 
are then marked as less legitimate than the others. This instability is incorporated in the very text 
of the ILO’s 1998 Declaration, article 5 of which 
Stresses that labour standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes, and that 
nothing in this Declaration and its follow-up shall be invoked or otherwise used for such 
purposes; in addition, the comparative advantage of any country should in no way be called 
into question by this Declaration and its follow-up.139 
This is in effect an internal constraint on what concrete outcomes can be advocated for on the 
basis of the Declaration, any abstract statement of “congruence” between efficiency and CLR 
notwithstanding. And when it turns out that a given standard is judged economically harmful, the 
ILO’s promotional work of CLR might be “open to accusations that ‘rent-seeking’ minorities are 
seeking to enact international labour regulation in their favour”.140 
Alan Hyde provides a model for the kind of (right-wing) reasoning against certain CLR that 
might lead to such a conclusion, in a contribution to an important special issue of Law and Ethics 
of Human Rights devoted to labor standards and CLR. Hyde explicitly differentiates two groups 
of CLR based on their economic impact. Child labor is explained to be bad for comparative 
advantage because it “leads to low-productivity and poorly-compensated workers.”141 Instead, 
                                                 
GLOBAL TRADE AND LABOUR STANDARDS—A CHALLENGE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 36–37 (1998). 
136 Supra, note 167. 
137 For example, the ILO’s principled stance against linkage was based on the idea it “should not advocate either 
restrictions on trade or a compulsory equalization of social costs.” ILO, Defending Values, Promoting Change, supra 
note 150; see also HEPPLE, supra note 102, at 59 (arguing that the 1998 Declaration “marks a significant shift from 
the priority given in earlier ILO conventions to matters which were believed to have a direct effect on economic 
competitiveness, such as hours of work, night work, unemployment and minimum age”). 
138 See KIMBERLEY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE UNDER GLOBALIZATION? 
28–45 (2003); THOMAS OATLEY, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 355 (5th ed. 2012). 
139 1998 Declaration, supra note 3, art. 5. 
140 Sean Cooney, Testing Times for the ILO: Institutional Reform for the New International Political Economy, 20 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 365, 371 (1999). 
141 Alan Hyde, The International Labor Organization in the Stag Hunt for Global Labor Rights, 3:2 L. & ETHICS OF 
HUM. RTS. 154, 163 (2009) [hereinafter Hyde, Stag Hunt]; see also Alan Hyde, A Game Theory Account and Defense 
of Transnational Labour Standards—A Preliminary Look at the Problem, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF 
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[c]hildren should be in school, acquiring human capital that can be a part of better development 
strategies.”142 Hyde also states that “[d]iscrimination against women is not a source of comparative 
advantage” and that [e]conomies grow when women participate in the labor force”.143 “However,” 
Hyde asserts, “it is a tougher problem to tackle than forced or child labor,” because discrimination 
“figure[s] deeply in some cultures’ value systems,” and “[i]t accomplishes nothing to assure a 
country that its trading rivals have greater rates of women’s labor force participation if the recipient 
of this assurance is motivated by its moral code, not economic rationality.”144 
On freedom of association, Hyde states that “a country or region may indeed realize 
comparative advantage by repressing unions and collective bargaining”.145 It “may well figure in 
its pitches to foreign investors and may redirect gains from trade into investment, or rich people’s 
consumption, and away from working people.”146 As a consequence, “it is simply pious to assert 
that enforcing this labor standard will not interfere with comparative advantage. It will, and the 
developing countries know it.”147 On the basis of these analyses, Hyde applies to child labor the 
game theoretic approach of the “stag hunt” or “assurance game,” which indicates that a Pareto-
efficient outcome can be achieved if countries cooperate to collectively eliminate child labor, but 
that inefficient “Nash equilibria” are reached because of the incentives to defect from cooperation 
by maintaining child labor, which gives defecting countries a short-term comparative advantage.148 
For those few standards that raise long-term comparative advantage (those against child labor and 
forced labor, it turns out, as well as occupational health and safety149), Hyde proposes non-binding 
promotional work by the ILO to make countries realize where their “true” long-term comparative 
advantage lies.150 Yet, the other two core labor rights, equality and freedom of association, are left 
severely criticized and delegitimized in this center-right take. 
D. Neoliberal Arguments on the Decent Work Agenda 
I have not found many neoliberal takes on the Decent Work Agenda. This may be evidence 
of a stronger consensus in favor of the DWA’s promotional strategy. It may also be evidence of 
the lesser notoriety of the DWA than of the 1998 Declaration. Nevertheless, I have two neoliberal 
critiques of the DWA to offer, as examples of how the neoliberal repertoire stays with us in more 
recent discussions. The first is significantly right-wing, in that it opposes any labor standard 
promotion. The second is a little more left-wing, though still very close to the center. These two 
arguments confirm that neoliberal arguments are generally titled to the right but can occasionally 
be used for moderately left-wing purposes. 
                                                 
LABOUR LAW 143 (John D.R. Craig & S. Michael Lynk eds., 2006). 
142 Hyde, Stag Hunt, supra note 141. 
143 Id. at 170. 
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state distributive impact of labor standards and spuriously assumes that “comparative advantage” unambiguously 
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148 Id. at 164–65. 
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The first set of arguments is from an editorial by Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf 
criticizing the ILO-commissioned World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization’s 
final 2004 report.151 The report, which is articulated inter alia around “making decent work a global 
goal,”152 is attacked by Wolf for enunciating “platitudes” rather than confronting the “painful 
choices” required for “growth.”153 Wolf criticizes the report for advocating labor standards at all, 
because in developing economies “the formal sector’s growth is stunted by regulation, generating 
a larger surplus of workers for an undercapitalised informal economy.”154 The “painful choice” 
that is required in these contexts is to “tolerate the operation of market forces, in rich and poor 
countries, uncomfortable though they may be.”155 The implication clearly is that no labor standard 
(or DWA-style social policy) is legitimate given the imperative of stimulating “growth.” Notice 
the similarity with the neoliberal arguments against trade/labor linkage described above. 
Brian Langille provides my second example of neoliberal takes on the DWA in a provocative 
recent article analogizing prevailing attitudes in the ILO to the Washington Consensus (the 
“Geneva Consensus”)156 and calling for a new approach to international labor law (a “Post Geneva 
Consensus”). The prevailing approach, in his view, is wrong because it assumes that there is a 
“‘big trade-off’ between . . . fairness and decency (Geneva) and economic efficiency 
(Washington),” and according to Langille “[t]here is no trade-off.”157 Quoting Amartya Sen’s 
Development as Freedom at length, Langille then explains why labor/employment law is 
harmonious with “economic growth,” given that the ultimate end of both is “human freedom,” 
which is itself furthered by growth.158 Therefore, “[l]abor law is at its root no longer best conceived 
as law aimed at protecting employees against superior employer bargaining power in the 
negotiation of contracts of employment.”159 Rather, for Langille, labor law’s raison d’être is the 
“regulation of human capital deployment” and the “instrumental and intermediate” goal of 
“productivity” as well as the “intrinsic and ultimate” goal of “maximizing human freedom.”160 
This is already quite different from Langille’s earlier invocation of Sen to defend the 1998 
Declaration against its left-wing critics, which I analyze in the human rights part below, in that 
“productivity” is a goal here, however “intermediate.”161 
Expressing approbation for the 1998 Declaration, Langille states that the document “is best 
understood not simply in instrumental terms (including women doubles the size of the workforce), 
but intrinsically as securing the freedom to participate itself (not to be excluded by discrimination, 
included by force or as a child, and to participate meaningfully via collective voice).”162 So far so 
center-left.
 
Langille then unexpectedly turns to “employment,” a reference to the first prong of the 
                                                 
151 WORLD COMMISSION ON THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF GLOBALIZATION, A FAIR GLOBALIZATION: CREATING 
OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL (2004). 
152 Id. at 110. 
153 Martin Wolf, Growth Requires Painful Choices, Not Platitudes, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at 19. 
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156 Brian Langille, Imagining Post Geneva Consensus Labour Law for Post Washington Consensus Development, 31 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 523, 532 (2010). 
157 Id. at 531 n.28. 
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Decent Work Agenda (“creating jobs”),163 and expresses reservations as to the very idea of 
promoting it. The result is a discussion that seems very much indebted to neoliberalism: 
Employment per se, on the other hand and on the view sketched here, is more problematic. 
Employment is not the natural category it once was. There are many ways in which productive 
activity can be carried on. We can address “disguised employment.” But it seems unlikely that 
labor law can or should act as a barrier to new forms of production. What it can do is be 
intelligent about how it deals with them primarily by considering whether tying aspects of 
social security—pensions for example, as well as other labor rights and standards—to 
individual employers makes sense in a world in which that might act as a significant barrier to 
the deployment of human capital with real intrinsic and instrumental costs. And at the same 
time we can remove the perverse incentives that are structured from insisting that we tie 
benefits and rights to employment thus encouraging its avoidance though disguised 
employment and other techniques.164 
The allusion to “disguised employment” is strange, because the paper up to then doesn’t 
mention the concept. This refers to situations where an employee is not treated as such, but rather 
as for instance an “independent contractor,” in order for the employer to avoid the legal obligations 
imposed by labor/employment law. Use of disguised employment is seen as a dangerous and illegal 
employer tactic in both domestic labor/employment law165 and international labor law.166 The 
suggestion that this is a “new form of production” which should not be barred by the imposition 
of labor standards is in line with the right-wing rationales discussed above. It is also exemplary of 
how neoliberal tropes articulated in previous debates might feed into discussions of the Decent 
Work Agenda. 
I now want to comment briefly on how this relates to Langille’s quoting of Amartya Sen, 
whose “capabilities approach” I associate with the human rights paradigm, as I will explain below. 
Here Langille introduces the concepts of economic productivity and growth, thereby situating 
himself on neoliberal terrain, making his comment on disguised employment seem coherent with 
the language adopted. But, as I will illustrate below,167 many others (including Langille elsewhere) 
have written about Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach from a pure human rights perspective, 
asking what labor standards are animated by the logic of human dignity and capabilities (or, as 
Langille himself puts it elsewhere, of the “equal right to concern for [individuals’] well-being and 
respect for their ability and need to exercise personal autonomy in leading fully-developed lives.” 
168) As will be evident from my analysis in part IV, the human rights language and Sen’s conceptual 
apparatus do not logically entail any of the foregoing talk of productivity and growth, or for that 
matter classical liberal notions of individual freedom. 
As a broader conclusion to this part, I will reiterate that the malleability of neoliberal discourse 
in my three polemics seems relatively high, though by no means absolute. So, market failures and 
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164 Id. at 549–50 (emphasis added). 
165 See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE 
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prisoner’s dilemmas impeding the adoption of long-term efficient standards can sometimes 
countervail the static equilibrium model portraying any labor standard as sub-optimal because it 
imposes costs beyond what “the market” dictates. This vocabulary can lead some actors to support 
some labor standards, though it seldom seems to lead to more than support for a few select “core” 
labor standards. We see that neoliberalism, while generally tilted to the right, can also be 
moderately left-wing. The idea of human rights converging with it to the right seems much less 
plausible. But to fully assess the potential for convergence, we need to analyze human rights 
approaches to labor law and add their ideological malleability to the picture. 
III. HUMAN RIGHTS ARGUMENTS 
In this part I present the human rights-based arguments made in favor of and against labor 
standards promotion across the series of debates I have been tracking: discussions of trade/labor 
linkage, the 1998 ILO Declaration on core labor rights (CLR) and the overall ILO legal corpus in 
light of the Decent Work Agenda. 
My analysis in this part reveals considerable plasticity in what can be argued for with the 
human rights language. That is to say that human rights are more malleable than neoliberalism and 
are used to support any position from the far-right to the far-left of the spectrum. Anything seems 
possible, as human rights contain the idea of the irreducibly local nature of labor standards, such 
that no labor standard can ever be made binding without state consent (see below the arguments 
on trade/labor linkage), as well as maximalist claims on the indivisibility of all labor standards as 
equally binding human rights. Between these two extremes, concepts like human dignity, freedom-
as-capabilities and procedural fairness allow for much fine-graining of which labor standards 
should be binding because they represent universal human rights. This extreme malleability refutes 
the idea that human rights converge or are complicit with neoliberalism, which is mostly right-
wing and occasionally left-wing. Given these ideological differences, convergence seems as likely 
as divergence. Before delving into my analysis, I start with a definition of what I mean by human 
rights. 
A. A Definition of Human Rights 
I use the terms “human rights” to designate a language which emerged sometime in the 1970’s 
and can be sharply distinguished from neoliberalism, classical liberalism and social legal thought. 
One important part of the discourse is the notion of protection of marginalized identities from 
injury. According to Duncan Kennedy, that is the core idea of the contemporary human rights 
language, where anti-discrimination rights are grammatically central to the repertoire (along with 
related commitments like the fight against genocide and apartheid).169 It seems plausible that this 
trope was built by different constituencies imitating each other in the move to conceptualizing 
justice as preventing injuries to marginalized identities, as in Janet Halley’s account of U.S. 
reconfiguration of feminist and gay advocacy along the lines of the claims developed by racial 
constituencies.170 It may also be possible to understand the importance of anti-totalitarianism and 
                                                 
169 Kennedy, supra note 69, at 65. For a broader critical account of the importance of injury and identity in 
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the figure of the political dissident, the documented 1970’s focus of human rights activists,171 as 
an idea infused by the imagery of state discrimination and injury to a minority identity. 
In addition, for Samuel Moyn, at least in context of the late 1970’s historical breakthrough of 
human rights, their “moral” and anti-political character was a predominant feature of the 
discourse.172 But Moyn also points to another characteristic of the human rights language: “the 
image of another, better world of dignity and respect”.173 The importance of “human dignity” to 
the contemporary language of human rights is hard to understate, though it obviously has existed 
in many different forms.174 It is central for many actors, including the famous international lawyer 
Antonio Cassese, who suggested that the “new doctrine of human rights” which in the period of 
1974 to 1990 superseded previous understandings of rights175 was based on “respect for human 
dignity”.176 While human dignity, as illustrated at length below often intervenes in labor standards 
debates through the incorporation of international human rights discourse, recent scholarly 
proposals seek to embed a normative theory of human dignity directly in domestic 
labor/employment law, without the mediating vehicle of international human rights.177 
One final concept is the “capabilities approach” pioneered by Amartya Sen178 and Martha 
Nussbaum,179 which incorporates notions like classical freedom and autonomy as well as social 
concerns for more substantive equality of opportunities and human/social welfare. The reason I 
associate this with human rights is that proponents of the capabilities approach often make the 
concept of human dignity central to their theories, as I will illustrate below. 
Participants to my 1994–2008 debates draw on all parts of the human rights vocabulary, in 
what often seems like a disorderly set of concepts that can be used for multiple contradictory 
purposes. On the 1998 core labor rights polemic in particular, I found three distinct axes of conflict 
on which participants use the above-mentioned tropes to do battle: universal vs. local, technical 
vs. general and process vs. substance-based labor standards. That is, it is uncontested for some 
participants that the human rights language requires the application of these three dichotomies in 
order to determine which labor standards should be promoted and in what way (e.g. you might 
argue that only “universal,” non-”technical” and “process”-based labor standards should be 
prioritized in the ILO as core labor rights). In exchanges over which labor standards fit in which 
                                                 
171 See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 170 (2010). 
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category, participants use the concepts of dignity, capabilities, universality, etc. to justify their 
advocacy of a policy proposal involving a given set of labor standards (and not others). 
The human rights repertoire also harbors specific legal arguments on how universally binding 
certain norms may be (either because they are jus cogens, customary international law or general 
principles applying to all U.N. Members) or, to the contrary, how non-binding the norms may be 
in the absence of state consent. This has repercussions both for the trade/labor linkage and the ILO 
debates. 
Before I start my analysis of the uses of human rights in debates on international labor 
standards, I want to stress that human rights are categorically different from neoliberal reasoning. 
That is not to say that the two paradigms do not sometimes get combined, and I will mention when 
that happens. But when someone does make a combined argument, say, that “core labor 
standards, . . . when applied, simultaneously meet the requirements of the market and of human 
rights and dignity,”180 we can analytically separate the two arguments because one does not entail 
the other. On a different but related point, we should definitionally exclude classical liberalism 
(based on absolute freedom of contract and property rights) from the human rights language. 
Whatever classical liberalism’s relationship to neoliberalism, an argument based on pure 
individual freedom as a power absolute within its sphere which cannot be displaced by legal 
enforcement of moral duties is not consonant with the newer vocabulary of dignity, injury, identity, 
capabilities, etc. I now turn to my analysis of the way in which human rights were used in the 
1994–2008 labor standards debates. 
B. Human Rights Arguments on Trade/Labor Linkage 
Here I discuss the human rights-based arguments in favor of and against trade/labor linkage. 
Actors making these arguments tend to be very preoccupied with asserting (or denying) the very 
legal bindingness of labor standards, no doubt in order to counter (or preserve) the influential 
neoliberal arguments against linkage analyzed above. As a result, the ideological struggle opposes 
those who favor linkage (the left) and those who oppose it (the right). There is less discussion of 
the substantive characteristics of labor standards that might make linkage desirable and how these 
characteristics apply to different categories of standards. As we will see, the human rights takes 
on the ILO 1998 Declaration explored below are, for their part, overwhelmingly preoccupied with 
comparing and selecting specific standards for promotion. 
The human rights case for linkage often starts with a claim to positive legal necessity: “Human 
rights law requires adjusting international law and international organisations so that they protect 
human rights more effectively.”181 It might be a claim that the WTO should be forced to obey the 
UN Charter, paragraph 1(3) of which binds states to “promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all”.182 Or it might be that states themselves have a legal 
obligation to “promote and protect” (and hence presumably to incorporate) human rights in their 
negotiation of trade treaties.183 Adelle Blackett, a famous international labor law scholar, writes 
that “although lex specialis rules might be invoked as challenges to the applicability of other bodies 
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of law to trade law,
 
the argument is weakened to the extent that trade law is itself increasingly 
difficult to circumscribe.”184 She then goes on to quote Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties185 for the proposition that, for the purposes of interpretation, 
“any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ must be 
considered.”186 For Blackett, this includes both customary international law187 and treaty 
obligations, placing ILO conventions squarely within the ambit of the WTO. 
Others are even less attached to state consent and anchor the legal obligation to respect labor 
standards in the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” which represent 
consensus inasmuch as they reflect the internal laws of many/most states.188 There is also the idea 
that some labor standards represent jus cogens, which according to Blackett includes several core 
labor rights such as the prohibition of forced labor, 189 as well as occupational health and safety as 
part of the overarching right to life (Blackett here makes an argument I will turn to below in the 
context of the 1998 ILO Declaration, according to which non-core, “technical” standards are 
required by more universal and non-technical fundamental rights).190 In this repertoire, not only 
                                                 
184 Adelle Blackett, Mapping the Equilibrium Line: Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and the Interpretive 
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do economic objections tend to be excluded, but there is also an arsenal of claims that sovereignty 
cannot justify labor standards violations.191 As I will outline below, the repertoire otherwise 
provides arguments that sovereignty does retain normative force and can protect some behavior 
from scrutiny under human rights norms. But it also, and that is what I want to briefly explore 
now, creates a need for a delineation of the specific labor standards that can be rendered so 
unequivocally legally binding (and be linked to trade law). 
Any determination of which labor standards are fit for linkage must disclose a set of selection 
criteria. These often revolve around the idea that one should distinguish “those labor standards that 
everyone would consider to be universal rights from other labor standards that will depend on 
given national circumstances.”192 Howse and Trebilcock, who were also prominent articulators of 
the neoliberal opposition to linkage, thus argued that “the most obvious and compelling normative 
basis for insisting on compliance with minimum standards” (note that only the minimum must be 
linked) lies in a “deontological conception of human freedom of equality.”193 Other proposals for 
linkage, of which Dani Rodrik’s is exemplary, assert the “requirement that economic activities be 
based on processes that are generally viewed as fair and legitimate”.194 For Rodrik, “discussion 
surrounding the ‘new’ issues in trade policy,” including “labour standards,” “can be cast in this 
light of procedural fairness.”195 Other accounts relate a certain set of labor standards to the 
normative objective of “promot[ing] the spread of democracy”.196 More concretely, according to 
one important proponent, only freedom of association and forced labor should be linked to trade, 
because other rights are not “basic human rights” and are not part of the “lowest common 
denominator”; rather, they are “technical labor standards” about which there is “less international 
agreement.”197 
Of course, state sovereignty is also an important principle of international law, no less of 
international human rights law. So, one can find (right-wing) arguments to the effect that ILO 
conventions are both too numerous and too detailed to evidence consensus in favor of universally 
binding labor standards, because states only ratify the details of these conventions in a context 
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where their non-enforceable character is clear.198 Arvind Panagariya, in an article quoted above,199 
voiced an argument against the idea that CLR represent general principles of international law 
susceptible to enforcement through trade sanctions (and that argument would probably hold 
against the 1998 ILO Declaration’s making CLR binding by virtue of mere country 
membership).200 This is less an argument to scale down the number and detail of linkable labor 
standards than to deny the very possibility of universally binding standards. The claim is that CLR 
can have many different legal implications and interpretations. Therefore, “[t]here are perhaps 
shared values but precisely how these values are to be translated into action is quite contentious.”201 
Moreover, the fact that for instance the United States has ratified only one of the CLR conventions 
“should alert the reader to the falsehood of any claims that there is general agreement among 
nations on a set of core labor standards.”202 As is evident, the foregoing arguments bleed into those 
related to the selection of a set of “core labor rights” from the broad corpus of ILO conventions, 
which led to the adoption of the 1998 Declaration. I turn to these arguments in the next part. Before 
I do, I note that the human rights arguments on linkage are evenly distributed across the ideological 
spectrum, such that they are as likely to be left-wing as they are to be right-wing. 
C. Human Rights Arguments on the 1998 Declaration and Core Labor Rights 
When one looks at the human rights rationalizations (and critiques) of the distinction between 
CLR and non-core labor standards, one finds, rather than an integrated position in favor of CLR, 
a hodgepodge of radically distinct arguments. I thus present not two coherent human rights-based 
positions in favor of and against the CLR paradigm but three axes of debate on which the human 
rights language provides tools to argue on the legitimacy of giving priority to a restricted set of 
standards. The three axes are (1) universal vs. local, (2) technical vs. general and (3) process vs. 
substance. Here the opposing camps are those who defend the appropriateness of the 1998 
Declaration’s four CLR (the right) and those who contest it and argue for a more expansive “core” 
(the left). The human rights case against any CLR promotion by the ILO, if it exists at all (this 
would be a third camp still further to the right), would probably be based on the human rights 
arguments and neoliberal against any linkage presented above. Like in the case of linkage, human 
rights arguments on the ILO 1998 Declaration are evenly distributed between the left and the right, 
along all three axes just mentioned. 
1. The Universal vs. Local Axis 
On the universal vs. local axis, proponents label CLR as universal and other standards as local. 
For example, Bob Hepple, the famous British labor lawyer, proposed such an analytic to 
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distinguish core from non-core labor standards based on the “principle of subsidiarity,” according 
to which jurisdiction over a given subject must be granted to the lowest (most “local”) entity 
compatible with the subject matter in question.203 For labor standards, this means that international 
regulation should only be concerned with “global,” “permanent” “fundamental rights” (and not 
“local,” “temporary” “short- or medium-term objectives of social policy”).204 For Hepple, it was 
already clear in 1994 that the “universal” standards were three of the four CLR (child labor, “equal 
pay between men and women” and freedom of association), as well as “the guiding principle that 
labour should not be regarded as a commodity or article of commerce.”205 
In 2004, Janelle Diller, who would eventually become the Principal Legal Officer of the ILO, 
wrote in a very similar fashion that the 1998 Declaration represented the realization of the 
“universally shared values at the heart of [the] mandate” of achieving “universal respect for a 
minimum set of rules for labour in the global economy.”206 The question for Diller is to ascertain 
when it is that “the conviction is strongly shared that certain common values should guide the 
conduct and goals of people or institutions” to the point where these values may legitimately “be 
embodied in multilateral treaties”207 For Diller, the 1998 Declaration represents the answer to such 
an inquiry. 
To this idea of the universality of CLR against the localness of non-core labor standards, other 
actors such as Nicolas Valticos, that mythical ILO figure, respond that the whole corpus of 
international labor standards is an indivisible instantiation of both the economic and social rights 
and the civil and political rights of the two UN Covenants.208 Consequently, it is wrong as a matter 
of human rights logic to segregate a class of labor standards and privilege them over others. In the 
words of Valticos, “international labour standards, as a body, constitute a special category of 
human rights, and . . . the structure now in jeopardy in fact represents a broad set of the rights that 
were painstakingly constructed and consolidated at the cost of two world wars.”209 In other words, 
all labor standards are universal. The (left-wing) idea of the indivisibility of labor standards (and 
the human rights they all embody) has considerable currency among both international labor law 
scholars210 and ILO officials.211 We thus have a quite elaborate repertoire of opposing claims on 
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the universal vs. local axis, from right to left. 
2. The Technical vs. General Axis 
I now turn to the technical vs. general axis of conflict. Janice Bellace, long-time US member 
of the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
offered her own rationale for the selection of the CLR, arguing that the 1998 Declaration was based 
on the determination of “which conventions proclaimed core values and which laid down technical 
standards.”212 “Technicality” here is associated with detail (as opposed to broad wording) and 
analogized to what “might be found in a fair labor standards statute” (as opposed to “fundamental 
human rights”).213 Clearly, this (relatively right-wing) argument has a theme of its own and asserts 
a certain logic of human rights which draws a line between broad rights and narrow “technical” 
standards as a matter of principle. This is an argument that many other actors have made,214 
sometimes with the surprising result that some of the four core labor rights are considered 
themselves more technical than others.215 
Other actors have a (left-wing) response to the idea that the distinction between fundamental 
rights and technical standards can guide ILO normative action. It is that the technical standards are 
required if the broad rights are to have any meaning at all. Deirdre McCann, a labor law professor 
and former official at the ILO, provides an account of “decent working hours as a human right” 
along those lines. She argues that the non-core conventions on working hours, far from being 
merely “technical” as suggested by some, “can be viewed as concrete expressions of the broader 
prescriptions of human rights documents, embodying the spirit of these instruments and advancing 
their goals by translating them into more specific instruments.”216 She echoes the words of the ILO 
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Within the Framework of the International Labour Organization, in IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
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Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations in claiming that 
the ILO conventions on working hours “have set forth principles which have been widely followed 
and have become part of the list of the fundamental rights of human beings and their dignity.”217 
As already noted, it has likewise been argued that occupational health and safety standards should 
be considered a fundamental human right (and CLR) because it is required by the broader right to 
life.218 Here again we have a set of clashing arguments, which span the left-right spectrum. 
3. The Process vs. Substance Axis 
In a heated exchange published in a 2005 issue of the European Journal of International Law, 
two scholars affiliated with the ILO, Brian Langille and Francis Maupain, provide a response to 
the above-quoted article by Philip Alston criticizing the 1998 Declaration for being based on a 
regressive neoliberal agenda.219 This particular exchange seems to be the most often cited set of 
articles on the 1998 Declaration and debates surrounding it. Here I dissect in some detail Brian 
Langille’s response to Alston in this epochal debate between a relatively left-wing position 
(Alston) and a relatively right-wing one (Langille), along a third axis: process vs. substance. 
Langille, an independent scholar with long-lasting interest and implication in ILO academic 
and legal affairs,220 defends the idea of process-oriented core labor rights as fundamental and as 
having normative precedence over substantive legal guarantees.221 He starts by preparing the 
reader for a “deeper and better account of international labour law”222 rather than what he takes to 
be the dominant view of the ILO’s goals: that of enforcing labor standards to counter a “rational 
race to the bottom” by states “trading off lower labour standards in order to secure economic 
benefits.”223 For Langille, the goal is not to prevent “member states from pursuing their individual 
self-interest, but rather to help member states see where their self-interest actually lies.”224 As in 
the article quoted above in part II.d, Langille reaches this conclusion through a reasoning borrowed 
from Amartya Sen. Here, rather than analyzing Sen’s thought and ascertaining to what extent 
Langille’s conforms to it, I want to quote extensively from Langille in order to map what he gets 
out of Sen for the purpose of rationalizing the core labor rights. 
Langille continues by stating that Sen’s thought emphasizes the “critical distinction between 
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our true ends and the various means of obtaining them.”225 For Langille, the end is neither “to 
increase GDP per capita” nor to “construct an international labour code” “for their own sake.”226 
Rather, for Langille: 
The best conceptualization of our true ends is that offered by Sen – that the point of all 
our striving is human freedom. By this he means the real capacity for human beings to lead 
lives which we have reason to value . . . . [H]uman freedoms of various kinds – social, 
economic, political – interact in complex mutually supportive ways.227 
So far, we have the goal of “human freedom,” which can come in social, economic and political 
forms and which allows human beings to “lead lives which we have reason to value.” Langille 
further fleshes out what this means to him: 
[O]n a view of human freedom as the end and the key means, the core rights sound in 
what labour law theory has long known – that while there is much room for and need of other 
laws and institutions to make for a just workplace, the most valuable legal technique 
(instrumentally and as an end in itself) has always been, and is, to unleash the power of 
individuals themselves to pursue their own freedom. Removing barriers to self-help is a core 
concern. The history of the labour movement and its relationship with the creation and 
provision of the other elements we value (substantive statutory entitlements for example) is, as 
Sen predicts, one of human freedom advancing its own cause.228 
We now have other elements to flesh out Langille’s “human freedom.” It is based on “self-
help” and the possibility for individuals (and, importantly, social movements) to “pursue their own 
freedom.” This account, which Langille argues provides the “conceptual coherence” of CLR 
contra non-core standards, leads to the substance/process distinction, in that CLR do not entail 
“the creation of substantive entitlements, but rather by the way of procedural protection.”229 
This leads to the following description of the substantive and procedural poles. The procedural 
nature of CLR is part of a “positive democratic, participatory story,”230 which resonates with such 
concepts as “industrial democracy, self-determination, workplace citizenship, the move from mere 
exit to voice, the power to contract, the idea of being an author, a subject creating workplace law 
rather than a mere object on the receiving end of a unilateral imposition of power.”231 Here is 
Langille connecting “free participation” in the market to something like human dignity (being 
treated as “actors rather than objects”): 
The ILO’s elevation of freedom of association to special constitutional status over fifty 
years ago is exactly in line with labour law’s conceptual map. But as it turns out there 
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are . . . other aspects of labour market unfreedom, other barriers to free participation, other 
barriers to a bargaining process in which both parties are actors rather than objects. Human 
beings can both be excluded from the market (by discrimination) or forced (literally) into it.232 
Langille tells us that this account “sounds in the same deep deontological Kantian notions of equal 
humanity as does most of our constitutional and human rights theory.”233 But Langille adds other 
qualifiers to describe the dual poles of substance and procedure: 
The ethic of substantive labour law is strict paternalism and the results are standards 
imposed upon the parties whether they like it or not. The ethic of procedural labour law is 
freedom of contract and self-determination—what people call industrial democracy—and its 
results are basic rights which, it is believed, lead to better, but self-determined, outcomes.234 
This quote contrasts to some extent with the previous one on human dignity but is more 
resonant with Langille’s reading of Sen as advocating “self-help.” Seemingly anticipating 
criticisms that this is a minimalist labor/employment law agenda, Langille states that “[a]s we all 
know this set of constraints is not a guarantee of justice,” because there are other ways that humans 
can arrive at the bargaining table in a condition of unfreedom (hunger, lack of bargaining 
expertise).”235 But for Langille, these issues pose no problem, as “[n]o one miantains [sic] that the 
core is a guarantee of just outcomes.” The narrowness of his procedural rationalization of CLR “is 
not a conceptual problem – it is rather part of the grammar of procedural regulation of the 
bargaining relationship.”236 
I have quoted Langille at such length the better to analyze other labor/employment law 
rationales based on Amartya Sen, some of which take explicit issue with Langille’s rationalizations 
of core labor rights. It is important to read carefully these competing interpretations, because Sen’s 
ideas have been very popular among labor/employment lawyers trying to inject new languages 
into the field,237 including on the issue of core labor rights in the ILO. Philip Alston, in a rejoinder 
to Langille’s reply to him, provides his own critique of Langille’s reading of Sen: 
[I]t should be noted that Sen concludes his book by stressing that we must not lose sight 
of the fact that freedom involves ‘considerations of processes as well as substantive 
opportunities’. In marked contrast, Langille invokes Sen to justify the proposition – more 
worthy of Hayek than Sen – that the main challenge ‘has always been, and is, to unleash the 
power of individuals themselves to pursue their own freedom’. 
In international human rights law, the interdependence of the two sets of rights – social 
and political, to use the shorthand terms – is axiomatic. Acceptance of the vital importance of 
individual liberty and empowerment does not, however, lead to the conclusion that the other 
half of the equation will be addressed automatically if freedom is secured.238 
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This response mischaracterizes Langille’s argument as individualist, whereas it is concerned 
with both individual and collective process rights as the priority category. That is, Langille likes 
unions and industrial democracy just as much as he does individual freedom. Nevertheless, 
Alston’s is one possible (left-wing) response, which draws heavily on the doctrine of the 
indivisibility of human rights, a recurring theme in the human rights language. 
Judy Fudge, a labor lawyer with occasional scholarly appearances at the ILO, provides a 
deeper critique of Langille’s rationalization of core labor rights which digs into Amartya Sen’s 
work to accuse Langille of providing a mistaken, “thin” reading of Sen. She proposes an alternative 
take which contests the adequacy of the CLR paradigm in light of Sen’s theory, thereby sounding 
an unequivocally human rights tone: 
[Langille] claims that Sen’s conception of freedom “dissolves the old distinction between 
formal and substantive notions of freedom.” While Sen’s conception may do this, Langille’s 
insistence on the fundamental grammar of labor law and its distinction between procedural 
labor rights and substantive labor standards tends to have the opposite effect.239 
Fudge then argues that “procedural rights need to be backed up by substantive commitments 
since a purely procedural understanding of core labor rights runs the risk of abuse of power in 
unequal bargaining situations.”240 She adds an often-made argument241 that the CLR need the 
implementation of non-core standards in order to even be effectively protected, arguing that 
“[m]aternity leave and benefits, a shorter standard work week, pay equity, minimum wages, and 
positive obligations to accommodate women’s domestic responsibilities are as important as 
prohibitions on discrimination if women are to achieve equality of capabilities.”242 Fudge then 
traces her disagreements to a mistake in Langille’s use of Sen: 
[T]he problem is not so much with Sen’s concept of capability, but rather in 
assuming that the concept of capability provides a complete theory of social 
justice. Sen is very clear to acknowledge that: 
Although the idea of capability has considerable merit in the assessment of the 
opportunity aspect of freedom, it cannot possibly deal adequately with the 
process aspect of freedom, since capabilities are characteristics of individual 
advantages, and they fall short of telling us about fairness or equity in the 
processes involved, or about the freedom of citizens to invoke and utilize 
procedures that are equitable. 
A normative theory of social choice is needed to supplement Sen’s theory of 
capabilities.243 
Fudge then digs up that complement from Sen’s own theory in the idea of “functionings,” 
which should be understood as an expansive and substantive version of Sen’s “human freedom” 
and capabilities: 
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[O]n Sen’s account it is not only the commodities that an individual has control over that 
are important for determining that individual’s welfare, “the capability of that individual to 
achieve a range of functionings with the commodity also has to be considered.” A capability is 
a type of freedom to achieve a number of different things a person may value being or doing. 
Central to this conception of capability is the idea of conversion factors, which are the 
characteristics of an individual’s person, society, and environment.244 
Fudge then claims that Sen’s theory requires both substantive social rights claims to 
“resources” and “procedural” rights. The first category, the substantive social rights, are “claims 
to commodities that can be converted by individuals into functionings”245 and are as fundamental 
to capabilities theory as procedural rights. This “provides for a much more robust set of social 
rights, which include things like the right to a minimum wage and maternity pay, than Langille’s 
core fundamental labor rights.”246 For Fudge, Sen’s theory leads to the conclusion that “social 
rights, even those that are directly redistributive, function in the same way as civil and political 
rights,”247 and should therefore not be distinguished from CLR. Here again we have a broad 
spectrum from right (Langille) to left (Alston and Fudge). 
I have covered three axes of disagreement inside the human rights language as applied to 
CLR: universal vs. local, technical vs. general and process vs. substance. On each of these three 
axes the language provides several rhetorical tools to argue in favor of more or less labor standard 
promotion. Moreover, a position within one of these axes does not necessarily cohere with 
positions on others. “Technicality” might have nothing to do with substance vs. process, or 
universality. Moreover, many foundational concepts, including capabilities, autonomy, human 
dignity and universality, are used to quarrel along the three axes and to defend both left-wing and 
right-wing positions on the left-right spectrum. Human rights are, here again, not associated with 
one side of the spectrum, like neoliberalism was. I now turn to the Decent Work Agenda in order 
to explore how the human rights language plays out in that debate. 
D. Human Rights Arguments on the Decent Work Agenda 
As detailed in part I, the Decent Work Agenda is a programmatic concept that came to define 
the ILO’s work, encompassing the four following prongs or objectives: “employment creation,” 
“rights at work,” “social dialogue” and “social protection.”248 This normative structure potentially 
fits awkwardly with the core/non-core structure established by the 1998 Declaration. Indeed, the 
second prong, “rights at work,” refers to the four CLR, begging the question of whether it has a 
“clear pre-eminence” 249 within the DWA or whether, on the contrary, the four objectives are 
equally emphasized. For the fate of the non-core labor standards embodying social and economic 
rights, that question is crucial. I present here gain a broad range of arguments relating to the place 
of core labor rights in the Decent Work Agenda, starting with (relatively right-wing) positions that 
privilege CLR and going on to (relatively left-wing) positions that treat CLR as equally important 
as “employment creation,” “social protection” and “social dialogue.” 
Jean-Michel Servais, then Research Coordinator at the ILO’s International Institute for 
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Labour Studies, articulates a position that distinctly privileges CLR over other DWA pillars. He 
claims that the ILO corpus can be separated into three categories of standards: (1) “public freedoms 
or social rights” (CLR, it turns out), (2) “more programmatic or promotional than directly 
compulsory” standards (concerning “employment, vocational training or the fight against 
discrimination”) and (3) a “third group whose technical content is more specific” (pertaining to 
“working conditions” and “social security”).250 Echoing the technical vs. general axis described 
above,251 Servais clearly privileges CLR, the “essential nature” of which is recognized by 
“everyone,” over “technical” standards, which confront legislators with “contradictory objectives” 
and “choices [to] be made,”252 in the context of the Decent Work Agenda.253 This is the most 
restrictive and right-wing take I could find on the Decent Work Agenda, short of opposing it 
altogether, as some neoliberals do. 
Amartya Sen, in a landmark article published in the ILO’s own International Labour Review 
in 2000 and republished in 2013,254 provides a slightly more left-wing analysis of the Decent Work 
Agenda. Sen focuses the bulk of his comments on the prongs of CLR and “social dialogue” and 
says close to nothing about the other two pillars of the DWA, “creating jobs” and “extending social 
protection.”255 In light of what Sen does say about rights and social dialogue, his neglecting of the 
two potentially more Keynesian parts of the DWA seems coherent. 
On the CLR component of the DWA, Sen opines that it is invaluable because “the invitation 
is not merely to produce fresh legislation,” because CLR can be promoted through the “creation 
of new institutions, better working of existing ones and, last but not the least, by a general societal 
commitment” to promote CLR.256 This non-interventionist rationale could be seen as part of the 
neoliberal language analyzed above, were it not for Sen’s insistence that CLR are distinctive 
because they are grounded in “ethical claims that transcend legal recognition” and are “part of a 
decent society.”257 
Turning then to the relationship between CLR and the other prongs of the DWA agenda, Sen 
puzzlingly cites Ronald Dworkin and treats that issue through the jurisprudential question of 
whether “rights-based reasoning” and “goal-based programing” (or “social goals”) are necessarily 
in conflict.258 Sen concludes that it is possible to avoid conflicts “[i]f the formulation is carefully 
done to allow the trade-offs that have to be faced.”259 In that case, “[t]he rights at work can be 
broadly integrated within the same overall framework which also demands . . . decent and 
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productive work”.260 Hence, there is no conflict between the CLR and the rest of the DWA for 
Sen. But that does not tell us how he sees the relationship between them, apart from there being 
no conflict. 
Sen then turns to the social dialogue pillar of the DWA and approvingly notes that it addresses 
“not merely the requirements of labour legislation and practice, but also the need for an open 
society” and the protection of the freedoms of “citizens with a voice who can influence policies 
and even institutional choices.”261 In addition to the intrinsic value of democracy, Sen describes 
its “protective power” for workers.262 The two examples of this given by Sen are the prevention of 
famines and the need to avoid financial crises and share the “burden of contraction” once these 
erupt (Sen refers to the then-recent example of the 1990s Asian financial crises). Social dialogue 
allows crisis-prone countries to avoid the “discipline of financial reform that the International 
Monetary Fund tried to impose on the economies in default [which] was, to a great extent, 
necessitated by the lack of openness and disclosure, and the involvement of unscrupulous business 
linkages.”263 Social dialogue does so by promoting “openness.” 
It bears notice that in all of Sen’s discussion there is no mention of the role of CLR (or “social 
dialogue”) in contesting and altering the “market” distribution of riches and entitlements. 
Nevertheless, Sen does exhibit some (limited) sympathy for non-CLR elements of the Decent 
Work Agenda, based not on a neoliberal analysis but on a decidedly human rights-based argument 
about “transcendent ethical claims,” “voice,” and an “open” and “decent society.” 
Bob Hepple provides an alternative rationalization of the Decent Work Agenda, in which 
“equality” is the overarching concept, along with “empowerment.”264 This rationale, which is 
applied to both the 1998 Declaration and the DWA, naturally encompasses “horizontal equality 
between workers,” “for disadvantaged groups, such as women, ethnic minorities and people with 
disabilities.”265 But it also includes, interestingly, “vertical equality,” “the aim of which is to 
compensate by social measures for the economic inequality between employers and workers.”266 
It is hard to figure out what this might mean at such a level of generality, but it does seem to be 
quite different from Sen’s approach. In particular, it is plausible that “job-creation” and “social 
protection” would be more central to an agenda of alleviating employer/employee inequality than 
they were to Sen. In other words, Hepple’s position seems more left-wing. 
Still further to the left side of that debate, we find Francis Maupain. In the famous above-
quoted article responding to Philip Alston’s critiques of both the 1998 Declaration and the Decent 
Work Agenda (DWA), Maupain provides a rationale that depicts the pre-1998 ILO as fragmented 
and the DWA as a way to further the “interdependence” of all labor standards: 
[B]y underlining the need to see workers’ protection as a whole, this concept [of Decent 
Work] can in fact help to bridge the gap inherent in the ‘self-service approach’ to standards by 
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recognizing and promoting their interdependence, which [sic] were recognized in Vienna to be 
‘universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated’.267 
This analysis rests on the critique of the “old [pre-1998] system” as a “pick-and-choose” 
model vulnerable to opportunistic and selective commitments by the member states.268 The idea is 
that the DWA represents a deeper fusion of all the international labor standards and makes them 
less vulnerable to selective ratification. 
Such an “indivisibility” approach was adopted by then Director-General Juan Somavia in the 
preface to a 2004 mélange offered to Nicolas Valticos. Somavia addresses the past and future of 
“the standards,” which “are the history of the ILO.”269 Here, “the standards” are addressed as an 
integrated whole and understood to “make decent work a reality.”270 The 2008 Declaration, which 
I address in more detail in part IV on social legal thought, incorporates this doctrine of indivisibility 
by referring to the four prongs of the DWA as “four equally important strategic objectives of the 
ILO”.271 It has been claimed that the 2008 Declaration, “while reaffirming the principles set out in 
the 1998 Declaration[,] goes beyond these by placing them within the context of ‘Decent Work’,” 
with no hierarchical relationship between them.272 Finally, at the far left of the ideological 
spectrum, there is the somewhat marginal argument that Decent Work itself is a right, 
encompassing a whole panoply of standards beyond the core labor rights.273 
I have covered a quite large spectrum of views, from Servais and Sen’s privileging of certain 
pillars of the DWA (and specifically of core labor rights) to those who view the ILO’s policy 
objectives as, like human rights, indivisible. We find here the same extreme malleability from left 
to right. 
As a broader conclusion to this part on human rights, I want to reiterate my central points. 
The homology between the three debates is quite clear, though the arguments themselves seem 
slightly more eclectic than they were in the case of neoliberalism. So, for instance, arguments on 
trade/labor linkage deal with the legal bindingness of human rights regardless of state consent and 
with criteria to distinguish which rights are properly universal so as to be fit for linkage (this is 
where tropes like dignity, fairness and preventing “harm” intervene). On the CLR issue, many of 
the same arguments are used to navigate the three axes of universal vs. local, technical vs. general 
and process vs. substance. In the context of the Decent Work Agenda, this same human rights 
vocabulary is used to argue for different systematizations of the Agenda, some of which distinctly 
privilege some prongs (e.g. CLR) and some of which treat the four pillars as “indivisible” and 
equally important from the point of view of human rights. 
I have also emphasized throughout that there is a loose grammar to human rights arguments 
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that is distinct from both neoliberalism and classical individualist liberalism. “Freedom” 
understood in a classical way is seldom invoked. Even Brian Langille’s take on the 1998 
Declaration, which has been (mistakenly) denounced by Alston as “worthy of Hayek,”274 deals 
with both individual and collective labor standards (freedom of association and collective 
bargaining) and rests on the idea of dignity attained through procedural empowerment, not 
individualism (or for that matter economic efficiency). I suspect that if someone were to make an 
actual Hayekian claim about the primacy of property and contract rights over labor standards, 
interlocutors would not engage with it on human rights terms as some have done with Langille’s 
claims, but would rather dismiss it as illegitimate and possibly anachronistic. In order to be 
considered as making a genuine human rights argument, one must go beyond classical liberalism, 
hence my insistence that the two registers must be understood as analytically distinct and 
separable. 
Finally, in all three debates, I found considerable malleability, in the sense that the human 
rights repertoire contains arguments to argue for anything from no labor standards at all to a 
maximalist view of all labor standards as universally binding human rights. This contrasts with 
neoliberalism, which was not so malleable and more consistently identified with the right. We see 
that positing systematic convergence between human rights and neoliberalism is wrong, as human 
rights can be and are more often identified with the left than neoliberalism. Thus, for example, 
left-wing human rights arguments are likely to conflict with right-wing neoliberalism, and right-
wing human rights arguments are likely to conflict with center-left neoliberal defenses of labor 
standards promotion. 
IV. SOCIAL LEGAL THOUGHT ARGUMENTS 
By now, I have provided a complete refutation of the thesis that human rights and 
neoliberalism converge by outlining their different ideological leanings and their potential for 
considerable divergence. Yet this does not describe the whole of the intellectual landscape, as I 
have not yet addressed what I call social legal thought, i.e. discourses based on social welfare and 
stability. While accounts of labor standards debates often neglect to discuss social legal thought, 
it merits a separate place in the analysis. Indeed, this discourse distinguishes itself from human 
rights, in that it emphasizes not individual dignity or human capabilities but the good of society. 
In fact, there is much evidence that human rights (like neoliberalism) was born as a discourse 
opposing social legal thought.275 Only once we have incorporated social legal thought into the 
picture can we have a thorough analysis of the intellectual and ideological structures that will stay 
with us in future policy discussions. This part explores the arguments based on social legal thought 
in the context of the three debates on trade/labor linkage, the adoption of the ILO 1998 Declaration 
and the struggle over the meaning of the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda. But first, I offer a more 
thorough definition of what I mean by social legal thought. 
A. Definition of Social Legal Thought 
“Social legal thought” (or “the Social”)276 was born in the second half of the 19th century as a 
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critique of classical individualist law and laissez-faire; the critique was that classical law was 
internally incoherent both substantively277 and methodologically,278 in that it entailed an “abuse of 
deduction” from incoherent individualist premises that led to sub-optimal results from a social 
standpoint. Moreover, individualism and laissez-faire led to crises and bred instability, because 
they allowed strong actors to unduly externalize many costs on society279 and thereby led law to 
be out of touch with social life and the new economic interdependence brought about by 
industrialization.280 
The key goal of the Social was to prevent crises and stabilize the social order, and its ethos 
was organicism understood as a rejection of individualism.281 This led to an embrace of teleology 
and instrumentalism at the level of legal reasoning, i.e. to seeing law as a “means” to the good of 
society, an organism composed of social classes, national minorities and “institutions” which 
should be coordinated with a view to curbing conflict and instability.282 One classic slogan of 
social legal thought was Karl Polanyi’s call for a protection of society against “the market” by “re-
embedding” the latter in the former.283 
The legal-institutional consequences of this approach were the creation of a new form of 
“social citizenship”284 based on “decommodification” and the carving out of various domains from 
19th century private law to constitute new quasi-public law fields (labor/employment law, housing 
law, youth protection regimes and so on indefinitely).285 The welfare state is therefore a central 
Social development, though it bears emphasis that in the North and the Global South both left-
wing welfare states (the U.S. New Deal, post-revolutionary Mexico in the 1930s, Post-War Britain, 
Arab socialist post-independence regimes, etc.) and right-wing organicist and/or developmentalist 
regimes (European and Japanese fascism, Peron and Vargas in Argentina and Brazil, etc.) all bear 
the marks of social legal thought, such that at least historically, the Social was as much heralded 
by the right as it was by the left.286 
Keynesianism is also characteristic of social legal thought, insofar as it posits a socially 
destructive “logic” of laissez-faire business cycles and purports to stabilize it by counter-cyclical 
macro-economic policy and public spending on the decommodifying social programs of the 
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welfare state.287 Just like the Social involved new domestic legal institutions to replace laissez-
faire law, the international order was also “juridified”288 through the creation of the League of 
Nations, the ILO and the Post-War Bretton Woods Institutions, with the goal of avoiding 
“individualist” behavior by states which threatens global stability and peace.289 
Before turning to the specific consequences for labor/employment law below, it bears mention 
that the preoccupation of proponents of the Social with global and domestic stability (i.e. avoiding 
wars and economic disruption) informed their attempts to eliminate tariffs through the GATT in 
the Post-War period (with no maximalist attempt to rule out non-tariff barriers or domestic welfare 
states)290 and their attempts to regulate labor conditions through the ILO. In the case of the ILO, 
the idea was both that poor working conditions might breed domestic social unrest and geopolitical 
instability291 and, according to Polanyi’s famous account,292 that international trade might lead to 
a “race to the bottom” in labor conditions and social protection, with the same resulting instability. 
In labor/employment law, the Social often places heavy emphasis on unions and collective 
bargaining, based on something like father of the NLRA Robert Wagner’s insistence that 
unionized workers are “organic groups unified by solidarity interests and norms.”293 This, 
combined with unions’ capacity to “equalize bargaining power” between employers and 
workers294 and foster “industrial peace,” not least through the maintenance of order and discipline 
in the workforce,295 meant that they should be privileged vehicles for regulating society through 
labor law. 
In the ILO, the obvious analog to this is the importance placed on tripartism, an ILO form of 
corporatist decision-making involving worker organizations, employer organizations and states,296 
as well as a general emphasis on ILO conventions on freedom of association and collective 
bargaining above all else, a recurring trope I identify with social legal thought in my debates. But 
there is more to the Social in the ILO context. Guy Standing usefully identifies traits which I 
consider to be paradigmatic of the Social as applied to the ILO, based on a general “commitment 
to a model of labourism legitimizing variants of industrial citizenship, in which social entitlements 
(‘social rights’, so-called) have been tied mainly to the performance of labour.”297 Standing 
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identifies two conventions which, along with those on freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, epitomize the ILO’s historical ethos: the Convention on Social Security No 102 of 
1952 and the Employment Policy Convention No 122 of 1964.298 The latter aimed to ensure “full, 
productive and freely chosen employment” and was one of the clearest examples of the 
Keynesianism of the times, while the former “call[ed] on governments to introduce benefits for 
nine ‘contingencies’, all linked to employment — medical care, sickness, unemployment, old age, 
employment injury, family, maternity, invalidity and survivor’s benefits.”299 Such was the 
historical approach of the ILO, based on its constitutional slogan that “labour is not a 
commodity.”300 As mentioned above, these traits were supplemented by the notion that 
unrestrained global laissez-faire would provoke a “race to the bottom” in labor conditions and 
have disastrous social results. Together, these ideas are what I mean by social legal thought in the 
context of my 1994–2008 debates. 
I now turn to my analysis of the way in which social legal thought was used in the 1994–2008 
debates. The arguments here seem more varied than they were for the other two languages. I will 
describe arguments based on “social dumping,” the idea of a “race to the bottom,” Keynesianism, 
the privileging of freedom of association, social security, and decommodification as ways to curb 
instability and, finally, the “right to work.” It is remarkable that, despite this wider variation in the 
themes covered, I found the same homology across topics than in the case of neoliberalism and 
human rights. So, for instance, arguments based on avoiding a race to the bottom in labor standards 
figure in all three settings, even though they were initially articulated in the trade/labor linkage 
context. 
However, and unlike neoliberalism and human rights, social legal thought always seems to 
point in the same direction of more labor standards promotion, i.e. it always seems left-wing. It is 
a lot less malleable and normatively indeterminate than my other two languages. Hence, we can 
foresee many divergences not only between human rights and neoliberalism but also between 
social legal thought and both these discourses. Finally, the Social has been significantly present at 
every step of my series of disputes, such that it doesn’t seem right to portray any one of the debates 
as dominated by a single language (be it neoliberalism for trade/labor linkage or human rights for 
the 1998 Declaration controversy). The Social has also been there all along, and it could very well 
have a bright future ahead of it. 
B. Social Legal Thought Arguments on Trade/Labor Linkage 
1. Social Dumping Arguments 
The first set of Social Legal Thought arguments I explore, that relating to “social dumping,” 
originates in the trade/labor linkage debate. Claims of “social dumping,” often made in the contexts 
of the European Union market and American federalism,301 are based on the idea that “exploiting 
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workers’ lack of bargaining power is not legitimate competition.”302 The analogy is of course to 
actual dumping, whereby a seller unfairly underprices its goods to drive out competitors and secure 
a more advantageous market position.303 The argument rests on the idea that poor working 
conditions provide a competitive advantage that is illegitimate and unduly harmful to competitors, 
who must scale down their own labor standards in order to compete.304 It requires that the main or 
only reason why a good is cheaper be the abnormally low labor standards.305 Making a “social 
dumping” argument also requires the proponent to put forward criteria for the identification of the 
level at which labor standards become unfairly low.306 Specifically, as put by Francis Maupain, 
this argument “runs up against the challenge of delineating what rights are relevant in the 
determination of ‘fairness’.307 One such argument rests on the idea that when states “grossly 
misrepresent the views or violate the interests of their citizens,”308 the resulting transactions of 
“products produced under repressive conditions” are illegitimate from the point of view of 
international trade.309 Another possible take is that social dumping “undermines internationally 
agreed norms of fairness” because it involves “practices that prevent workers from using their 
economic power to improve their compensation and conditions of employment” and has the effect 
of “depressing global economic demand and fostering social instability” (note the Keynesian 
twist).310 
While it is often claimed that social dumping arguments are discredited and incoherent (what 
is a fair or normal level of labor standards?),311 some high profile actors have made such arguments 
in favor of trade/labor linkage, as well as in the context of mere ILO promotional work. The 2008 
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ILO Declaration on Social Justice, which I analyze in more detail below, notes at its article IA(iv) 
that “the violation of fundamental principles and rights at work [CLR] cannot be invoked or 
otherwise used as a legitimate comparative advantage”.312 This is a straightforward social dumping 
argument which purports to pronounce on the “legitimacy” of the comparative advantage enjoyed 
by a country found in violation of the ILO core rights. It directly clashes with the statement made 
in the 1998 Declaration, in which, as noted above, “The International Labour 
Conference . . . [s]tresses that . . . the comparative advantage of any country should in no way be 
called into question by this Declaration and its follow-up.”313 
In his report to the International Labour Conference in 1997, Director-General Hansenne 
voiced a similar claim, combining in a single statement what would end up being the two 
contradictory articles from the 1998 and 2008 Declarations: 
[A] comparative advantage linked to a certain level of wages or social protection is 
legitimate, particularly if it is a factor of economic growth[—]and thus, by extension, of social 
progress. I believe, however, that this principle should have as its corollary that any such 
comparative advantage would, if it were artificially maintained to the detriment of social 
progress as a mere means of winning markets, lose all legitimacy.314 
Hansenne did not overtly advocate trade/labor linkage in that report issued one year after the 
dismal failure of attempts to steer WTO member states in that direction.315 He was addressing ILO 
promotion of labor standards. This goes to show that while originally elaborated as a peculiarly 
trade-related analogy, “social dumping” arguments were used subsequently in debates about the 
1998 Declaration, the 2008 Declaration and the Decent Work Agenda. 
2. Race to the Bottom Arguments 
The next set of arguments I address relates to the idea of a “race to the bottom” and the need 
to prevent it. In a nutshell, the idea is that capital mobility and trade liberalization create downward 
pressure on labor standards, making it impossible for states to maintain these standards and leading 
to undesirable social results.316 This argument contradicts the idea that the productivity of workers 
or “economic fundamentals” is the main explanation for differences in labor standards between 
countries. 
Global laissez-faire is said to create downward pressure on labor/employment laws in two 
ways. The first, and the most common, is “regulatory arbitrage,”317 whereby competition for 
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advantage gained by violating them. MAUPAIN, supra note 18, at 138. He argued, by reference to the GATT concept 
of “normal price,” quoted supra note 315, that “judging ‘normality by reference to rules preventing ‘social oppression’ 
[meaning CLR] seems more promising: in many ways this reasoning corresponds well with the identification of 
fundamental rights [CLR] as ‘enabling rights.’” Id.  
316 As noted by Robert Howse, race to the bottom arguments are often quite distinct from claims of social dumping, 
as unlike the latter they do not rest on the idea of restoring the proper level of labor-cost competitiveness but rather 
postulate a downward spiral that is harmful regardless of the trading partners’ starting point. Robert Howse, The World 
Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers’ Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 165 (1999). 
317 See Drezner, supra note 89; Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The 
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 1960–2000, 60:4 INT’L ORG. 811 (2006). For a critical take, see Richard B. 
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capital and trade traps states into a prisoner’s dilemma in which the only rational course of action 
for all participants is to lower labor standards to get a competitive edge.318 However, this makes 
everyone worse off because once all states lower their labor/employment laws, no one gets a 
trading advantage, and labor/employment laws are just less protective than before.319 The second 
way in which laissez-faire is said to create downward pressure on labor laws is through “a decline 
in revenues resulting from lower tariffs and lower profit taxes [which] forced many governments 
to cut expenditure, including in the social sector.”320 Hence, falling state revenues caused by trade 
liberalization drive the “lowering” of some labor standards and social programs. 
Notice that all the Social arguments reviewed in this part take the very left-wing position of 
advocating linkage of many labor standards with the trade regime. It also bears mention that the 
race to the bottom idea is invoked in subsequent discussions in the ILO as a justification for more 
labor standards promotion. Guy Standing, in a critique of both the Decent Work Agenda and 
various institutional developments such as the shifting of resources away from standard-setting 
activities, gives the ILO an overarching goal steeped in a race to the bottom rationale. Since “in 
the globalization era labour costs are part of trade competition”, the ILO must seek to find ways 
of “limiting labour cost differences between countries” and embrace a much more ambitious 
version of the Decent Work Agenda.321 Other actors have argued that the core labor rights ILO 
strategy should be modified and expanded to counter the socially destructive effects of a race to 
the bottom on non-core labor standards.322 
C. Social Legal Thought Arguments on the 1998 Declaration and Core Labor Rights 
Despite the omnipresence of human rights rationalizations of the 1998 Declaration, as well as 
of critiques that existing human rights rationales represent a dilution of the ILO’s Social agenda, 
it is interesting to note that as a matter of historical fact there were, even at the very time of the 
adoption of the 1998 Declaration, wholly Social rationales for that document. Importantly, these 
rationales are all identified with the left of the ideological spectrum. 
In 1998, shortly after the adoption of the 1998 Declaration, the International Labour Review, 
the academic journal of the ILO, published a special issue entitled “Labour Rights, Human Rights,” 
which seems to be an important part of the discourse around the shift to core labor rights. The 
anonymous introduction by the editors to the special issue provides an interesting example of how 
social legal thought can be used to “speak” labor standards. The editors start by indicating that the 
special issue celebrates the 50th anniversary of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), 
                                                 
Freeman, Are Your Wages Set In Beijing?, 9:3 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 15 (1995). For an invocation of the race to the 
bottom rationale in the context of “linkage” at the level of NAFTA, see Nicholas Keresztesi, Mexican Labour Laws 
and Practices Come to Canada: A Comment on the First Case. Brought to Canada Under the North American 
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318 Langille, supra note 32, at 42. It seems like quite an important point that what matters in the race to the bottom 
dynamic is the threat of, and not merely actual divestment. Id.; Mundlak, supra note 12, at 242. 
319 See Brian Langille, Labour Standards in the Globalized Economy and The Free Trade/Fair Trade Debate, 
in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS AND ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 54, at 229, 335–36. 
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both adopted in 1948. They then reveal their goal of demonstrating that these two documents “can 
be strong tools for those who seek to pursue the vision of a world where the humanity and dignity 
of each person are fully respected.”323 So far so human rights-sounding. The editors then say that 
they will explain “what these important instrumentsand especially Convention No. 87[—]have 
accomplished and of what they are still capable.”324 Freedom of association is given predominance 
in the editors’ analysis. The reasons for this become clear a few lines later. Indeed, “[t]he central 
focus of this special issue is on the instrumental right of freedom of association”,325 because 
“[w]ithout the right to associate, whether exercised or not, the prospects for achieving social justice 
are poor.”326 Contrary to many advocates of the human rights rationales for core labor rights, for 
whom as already noted the 1998 Declaration is a historic breakthrough and “the first 
pronouncement expressly proclaiming a ‘human rights’ orientation for the ILO,”327 the editors 
describe the 1998 Declaration as just “another historic milestone in the promotion of social 
justice.”328 
This shows that a few months after the 1998 Declaration was adopted, there already existed 
in the heart of the intellectual community of the ILO329 an alternative approach to the more 
conventional human rights CLR rationale, one rooted in social legal thought, and specifically in 
the prioritization of freedom of association as the one right necessary to achieve broader “social 
justice.” This approach of course resonates with Social theorizing about the importance of freedom 
of association over other ILO standards because of its role in “social dialogue,” “deliberative 
democracy,” and “collective interest formation” (by contrast with individual-based conceptions of 
autonomy).330 The contributors to the 1998 special issue were not engaged yet in subsequent 
debates on the link between the Declaration and the broader Decent Work Agenda (DWA). Yet, it 
is plausible that their arguments would support and pave the way for the (partial and contested) 
consolidation of the DWA under a left-wing Social agenda in the 2008 Declaration, which is 
described below. 
We can also trace a different kind of Social rationale for core labor rights, one based on 
Keynesianism. Speaking at a conference chaired by the IMF First Deputy Managing Director 
alongside World Bank and ILO officials, David Smith, then director of the AFL-CIO’s Office of 
Public Policy, offered a classic Keynesian justification for core labor rights. After noting that core 
labor rights are “not quantitative,” but “expressly qualitative,” and that they are “procedural 
rights,” Smith argued that international financial institutions should promote CLR not only for 
human rights reasons, but also because they are “necessary [for] . . . sustainable economic 
                                                 
323 ILO, Introduction: Labour Rights, Human Rights, 137:2 INT’L LAB. REV. 127, 127 (1998). 
324 Id. at 127 (emphasis added). 
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326 Id. at 128. 
327 Bellace, supra note 15, at 5. 
328 Id. at 129. 
329 Contributors to the special issue include such leading ILO employees and scholars as Nicolas Valticos (former 
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development”.331 That is because the historical enactment of labor standards in developed 
countries “contributed to the development of a broad middle class . . . precisely because it created 
a domestic consumption base, where domestic demand led the process of development. [It also] 
created more sustainable [economic situations that were] less prone to crisis [and] less prone to 
disruption”.332 
All these examples show that it is possible to rationalize the 1998 Declaration and CLR in a 
Social way and that such rationalizations did exist. They are all left-wing in that they propose 
broad promotion of labor standards to enact wealth redistribution and collective associative 
activity in the name of the good of society. Moreover, it is plausible that there is some resonance 
between these approaches and subsequent Social arguments on the Decent Work Agenda, to which 
I now turn. 
D. Social Legal Thought Arguments on the Decent Work Agenda 
Stephen Pursey, then Senior Economic Policy Adviser at the ILO, wrote in 2002 that the first 
pillar of the DWA, that of CLR, “influences the development of the legal framework for the 
realization of the goal of decent work for all”333 Moreover, it “has been the core of the institution’s 
mandate since it was created with the objective of promoting social justice and dignity at work.”334 
This is, I note in passing, an interesting retrospective projection of “social justice” as the 
foundation of the 1998 Declaration, one with which many human rights proponents quoted above 
might disagree. 
Discussing the second DWA pillar, the “creation of more and better jobs,” Pursey explains 
that “[e]mployment is the first step in escaping poverty and social exclusion.”335 As for the third 
pillar, “social protection,” “[t]he goal is to insure people against the major risks to their earning 
power, and prevent accidents and work-related illnesses.”336 Finally, the pillar of “social dialogue” 
“aims to better the processes by which differences of interest are resolved and common aims 
identified and pursued”.337 Pursey’s take is more left-wing than others such as Amartya Sen’s, 
analyzed above, in that it stresses the importance of every pillar of the DWA, providing Social 
rationales for each.338 
Janelle Diller, then Principal Legal Officer of the ILO, presented a very similar analysis of 
the Decent Work Agenda in a 2007 panel on international labor law at the annual meeting of the 
American Society of International Law (ASIL) (the first panel of its kind at the ASIL since 1999). 
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Diller indicates that “international labor law is rooted in the constitutional mandate of the ILO, 
and the concept of ‘decent work’ is essentially a formula for the convergence of four primary 
constitutional objectives.”339 Having equated the Decent Work Agenda with the goals of 
international labor law itself, Diller goes on to elaborate the following analysis, based on a trade-
related argument and what looks like a race to the bottom idea, as well as a clear concern for 
instability and social insecurity: 
The Wall Street Journal yesterday reported the “misgivings” of free trade advocates about 
the social impact of globalization; concerns that the downsides of trade are deeper than once 
realized focus especially on job insecurity . . . . [I]t is these concerns that are at the heart of the 
aims of international labor law: job insecurity, protection of workers’ income, decent working 
conditions, and avoiding abuse . . . . [T]he usefulness of law as a means for giving voice and 
effect to these widely shared values can be pursued through the application of normative 
principles (e.g., rights) that are necessary to realizing the ultimate goals . . . .340 
The reference to the instrumental use of “rights” to achieve the broader goals of the DWA, 
identified as inter alia job security and protection of workers’ income, is a clear attempt to provide 
a Social rationale for the DWA. In Diller and Pursey’s analyses, the four pillars of the DWA seem 
equally valued, in accordance with the idea that decent work is “a cross-cutting, holistic concept 
which should have an impact greater than the sum of its four constituent parts”.341 
So far I have presented arguments on which DWA prong to prioritize. The arguments are all 
left-wing, i.e. they give equal importance to the four prongs of the DWA as part of a broad 
Polanyian agenda for re-embedding the market in society and promoting redistribution. I now want 
to explore how some Social takes give content to individual prongs of the DWA besides CLR. 
Doing this reveals another axis of ideological conflict: that of less and more expansive definitions 
of each DWA prong. 
Francis Maupain has claimed that “fundamental rights aside, there is no goal to which the ILO 
has accorded a higher priority” than employment creation and stimulation, the first objective of 
the DWA.342 But, as Kerry Rittich points out, everyone agrees that more employment is a good 
thing; the question is whether to get there by anti-inflationary macro-economic policies, low 
exchange rates and the “free market” or through stimulative Keynesian macro-economics and 
“regulation.”343 What makes an employment-related proposal Social cannot just be favoring 
employment in the abstract; it has to privilege the stimulative, interventionist route over the “free 
market.” And that is what many actors and organs have done. 
For instance, the ILO Committee of Experts, in its 2010 report on the application of 
conventions related to the first pillar of the DWA (“creating jobs”), provides a Social rationale in 
support of Employment Policy Convention No 122 of 1964, a document strongly identified with 
the ILO’s Social and Keynesian past and which binds states to promote “full employment” through 
macro-economic policy-making.344 The ILO uses the following definition of “full employment”: 
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it is a “situation where all persons seeking employment have been provided with paid positions.”345 
This does not tell us exactly how the goal is to be reached, yet the affinities with an ambitious 
Keynesian vision seem clear.346 Indeed, it ignores concepts like the “Non-Accelerating Inflation 
Rate of Unemployment” and the “Natural Rate of Unemployment,” which were used to criticize 
Keynesianism and drastically reduce the level of employment that could be stimulated through 
macro-economic policy without purported disastrous consequences for inflation.347 These 
concepts were important tools in the historical triumph of neoliberalism over Keynesianism, 
leading to the “rejection of a role for demand-management policies to limit unemployment to its 
frictional component”.348 Ignoring these concepts is a left-wing approach that favors more 
stimulative government interventions to empower workers economically. 
Moreover, in its 2010 report, the Committee of Experts digs up some 1984 amendment to the 
Employment Policy Convention (corresponding to the DWA prong of “job-creation”) which 
specifies that it should be considered as an instrument in the service of the “realization of the right 
to work as a human right”.349 While it is famously unclear what “the right to work” means, that 
concept has been a rallying cry for socialists and left liberals at least since the French revolution 
of 1848 (as a response to calls for “property rights”).350 It has also, like other social and economic 
rights, been considered non-justiciable for a long part of its history.351 However, as a programmatic 
concept (or somewhat justiciable right), it can involve various obligations to provide and create 
employment as well as obligations pertaining to the quality of working conditions.352 The very 
idea of a right to work suggests something between a little and a lot more than merely benefiting 
from employment created through “free market” means; in other words, it seems to require the 
kind of state intervention that is central to a left-wing project of wealth redistribution. 
In an important 2004 mélange volume dedicated to Nicolas Valticos, Anne Trebilcock, senior 
official and former Legal Adviser to the ILO, proposed a “sketch of provisions from a range of 
Conventions and Recommendations relevant to decent work and the informal economy”,353 the 
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normative goal being to “mak[e] decent work a reality for all workers and employers.”354 While 
Trebilcock does discuss the four CLR and the 1998 Declaration under the heading “Human 
Capabilities and Empowerment,”355 she also discusses the Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
Convention, corresponding to the “social protection” prong of the DWA, in strikingly Social terms: 
The basic ILO instrument in this field is the Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
Convention, 1952 (No. 102). Certainly, its gender-biased language would suggest 
contemporary irrelevance; however, the underlying approach of the Convention is fully up to 
date for addressing the informal economy. It is based on notions of solidarity and progressive 
extension of coverage. This approach is at odds with more recent trends in social protection 
that shift the burden of risk to the individual, and link delivery to profit-making institutions. 
These are trends that are of little use to the poor or indeed to those who risk falling into poverty 
because of a catastrophic event.356 
We find there again a left-wing kind of social legal thought, with a combative edge 
denouncing the privatization of social services and advocating for “solidarity” and poverty 
alleviation. 
The final event worth analyzing is the adoption of the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for 
a Fair Globalization by the International Labour Conference. Its main legal import is said to have 
been the constitutionalization of the Decent Work Agenda, which had never been formally 
included in a treaty but was rather a programmatic initiative launched unilaterally by the Director-
General in 1999.357 The 2008 Declaration’s other important move was to re-introduces freedom of 
association/collective bargaining as the most important CLR in its article IA(iv), describing the 
CLR prong of the DWA as follows: 
[R]especting, promoting and realizing the fundamental principles and rights at work, 
which are of particular significance, as both rights and enabling conditions that are necessary 
for the full realization of all of the strategic objectives, noting: – that freedom of association 
and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining are particularly important to 
enable the attainment of the four strategic objectives.358 
As mentioned above, the idea that unions and collective bargaining should be the privileged 
regulatory mechanism is an organicist and collectivist trope that was historically central to social 
legal thought. Its reaffirmation builds on the Social takes on the 1998 Declaration mentioned 
above, which prioritized freedom of association and collective bargaining. This is a left-wing idea, 
as it favors a very expansive agenda of wealth redistribution and uses collective bargaining as a 
tool to further that social goal. 
In addition, Maupain mentions the International Labour Conference employer group’s 
“stubborn resistance” to the inclusion of the words “decent work” in the 2008 Declaration’s title 
(in order to avoid a more expansive definition of the ILO’s role in promoting labor standards).359 
According to Maupain, this is one of the factors that paradoxically facilitated the “revisit[ation] of 
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‘social justice,’ the leitmotif of official rhetoric during the Cold War, which had (due perhaps to 
its ‘collectivist’ connotations) fallen into relative disfavour almost immediately after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall.”360 
Maupain is not alone in interpreting the adoption of the words “social justice” as a turn to a 
more expansive Social agenda. Hughes and Haworth report that “[t]he 2008 
Declaration . . . signals the moving-on of the ILO from the politics of the 1998 declaration,”361 
insofar as it proclaims a “broader mandate for social justice.”362 
Keeping this semantic quarrel in mind allows us to better understand the political stakes of 
historical and normative claims about the relationship between the 1998 Declaration, the Decent 
Work Agenda and the 2008 Declaration. Hence, when left-leaning ILO actors like long-time ILO 
Committee of Experts member Janice Bellace conflate Decent Work and “social justice,” treating 
them as evidently one and the same, we should see this as a political maneuver: 
The exact title spotlights the fact that the 2008 Declaration expresses the contemporary 
vision of the ILO’s mandate, one of social justice, in an era of globalization. Moreover, because 
only months before at the ILO Forum in Lisbon, “Decent Work” had been linked expressly to 
“fair globalization,” there was a definite implication that social justice was at the heart of 
Decent Work.363 
Of course, the specific legal implications of “social justice” in a statement like this are up for 
grabs. The point is that as long as these abstract concepts are understood by some to have divergent 
normative consequences (in this case, social justice being more expansive than decent work, and 
decent work being more expansive than core labor rights), the programmatic place of a concept 
like “social justice” will remain an important legal-political issue for actors involved in ILO 
debates. 
This part has illustrated that Social arguments are present in every one of the three debates 
covered in this article. Despite there being more variety in the types of claims made under the 
Social banner than in the human rights and neoliberal languages, I found the same homology across 
the debates, suggesting here again that users of the language cumulatively produce a repertoire 
that survives a given debate and influences future ones. However, unlike in the case of human 
rights (and to a lesser extent neoliberalism), Social arguments are not very politically malleable, 
in the sense that, in my localized debates, they seem to always advocate more labor standards 
promotion, a left-wing orientation. Of course, one could conceive of arguments based on things 
like preventing instability and fostering solidarity that would exclude a number of labor standards 
as not relevant to these goals, thereby resulting in a more restrictive and right-wing labor law 
agenda. But the fact that I could not find any suggests that this is not how the language is used, 
experienced and constituted. This fact has a lot to tell us about the role social legal thought is likely 
to play in future debates. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has undertaken to taxonomize claims made in three debates about international 
labor standards: (1) polemics in the 1990s about trade/labor “linkage” in the WTO, (2) discussion 
of the selection of “core labor rights” to be included in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration and (3) the 
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1999–2008 exchanges on the shape of the ILO corpus under the Decent Work Agenda. My goal 
has been to criticize the idea that institutional developments like the adoption of the ILO’s 1998 
Declaration can be seen as the triumph of one language, in this case that of human rights, and that 
the adoption of a human rights language somehow is complicit or resonates with either 
neoliberalism or classical liberal individualism. 
I have claimed that a given legal institution can often be rationalized according to different 
legal languages, with varying political consequences as to the expansiveness of the labor standards 
promotion agenda that is advocated. Moreover, I have argued that the human rights discourse can 
and should be distinguished from classical individualism. It contains new concepts of dignity and 
harm that seldom seem to be reducible to a set of classical individual property and contract rights 
even through legal work by neo or classical liberals. In my debates, there are very few influential 
attempts to restrict labor standards to classical liberal rights, and those that exist do not tap into the 
human rights discourse but rather use the instrumentalist efficiency analyses of neoliberalism. 
Social legal thought is another omnipresent discourse that is not reducible to either human rights 
or neoliberalism. I have suggested that these three discourses were used throughout my three 1994–
2008 debates and that there is considerable homology between their uses across the topics (for 
example, many arguments on trade/labor linkage oddly resemble arguments on the 1998 ILO 
Declaration). Finally, I have demonstrated that the three discourses vary in their degree of political 
malleability, such that the human rights language is extremely flexible in the range of positions it 
can accommodate (from many labor standards to be promoted to none at all), while neoliberalism 
is less flexible and social legal thought even less. From this I have concluded that, given the 
empirical fact of the extreme malleability of human rights, there is no reason to think that they will 
converge more often than not with neoliberalism, or with social legal thought for that matter. 
I now want to take a step back from my perhaps excruciatingly detailed analysis and propose 
speculative thoughts (no more than that) on broader ideological trends that might help explain the 
peculiar configuration described in this article. The configuration, remember, is one whereby 
human rights can be equally right and left-wing, neoliberalism mostly right-wing though quite 
malleable and social legal thought consistently left-wing, with the left understood as more and the 
right as less inclined towards labor standards promotion. What follows does not pertain to the 
material and ideational factors that caused this configuration. Rather, they are hints at some 
intellectual tendencies that track my findings here. 
The right-wing orientation of neoliberalism may be commonsensical to many readers. 
However, it is the product of a historically significant shift, the abandonment of classical liberalism 
by the left. It used to be the case that many labor unions and socialist parties advocated for the 
right to strike on the basis of absolute property in one’s labor,364 for collective bargaining as actual 
freedom of contract365 and for statutory employment standards as fair return to one’s contractual 
performance of work under freedom of contract.366 These were all tropes that embraced classical 
liberalism. The left abandoned this tradition and turned massively to the organicism of social legal 
thought (e.g. “industrial democracy”) over the course of the 20th century.367 The post-1968 leftist 
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critiques of the governance program of the Social, after an initial flirt with anti-authoritarian 
radicalism,368 led to the triumph of human rights as the dominant program of the left,369 with a 
pride of place for identity politics in various forms (the fight against discrimination, genocide, 
apartheid, homophobia and sexual violence as injuries to identities).370 
The late 1960’s also mark the moment where the right decidedly embraced liberalism as its 
political project. When we look beyond the narrow realm of global policy debates on labor 
standards, the distinction between revivals of classical liberalism and instrumentalist efficiency-
based neoliberalism loses some of its relevance. The contemporary right embraces both of these 
things, with the work of Reagan judicial appointments371 and Friedrich Hayek372 representing 
examples of classical liberal revivals and Coasian law and economics373 and the analyses of the 
IMF and the World Bank374 representing instrumentalist views based on the goal of efficiency. 
This distinction loses its importance because the crucial point is that the right has to a large extent 
abandoned social legal thought in favor of liberalism writ large, both classical and economic 
efficiency-oriented. This seems to explain why I found so few right-wing arguments under social 
legal thought. 
However, it used to be the case that fascism, right-wing Christian democracy and some forms 
of southern developmentalism (e.g. Peron and Vargas in Argentina and Brazil) produced right-
wing social legal thought.375 Factors that might have led to the disappearance of this ideology 
include the discredit of right-wing corporatism and fascism after World War II,376 the influence of 
the right’s fight against the southern developmental state377 and the widespread idea on the right 
that the northern welfare state (even in its right-wing Christian democratic form) carried the seeds 
of fascism and communism378 (the Social as “The Road to Serfdom”379). These trends may have 
led many on the right to durably abandon Social organicism in favor of (neo)liberalism. It bears 
emphasis that the foregoing probably applies only to debates on “market” issues, as opposed to the 
family and civil society (encompassing e.g. criminal law, the rights of children in the family and 
in school, abortion and gay rights, gender equality, etc.).380 In the domain of family and civil 
society, the right may remain organicist (and Social) in the sense of being opposed to individual 
rights and favoring individual sacrifice for the purported good of society (think of “social 
conservatives”).381 But in the market, including on labor standards, the right’s shift to 
(neo)liberalism and atomistic individualism seems close to universal. 
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The foregoing might explain why neoliberalism is predominantly right-wing and social legal 
thought left-wing on the market question of labor standards promotion. But more would be 
required to explain why neoliberalism is nevertheless more malleable than social legal thought. It 
may be that neoliberalism, now more ubiquitous and central than the social legal thought it 
displaced, is subject to heavier critiques and forced to please a broader array of audiences. The 
critiques of neoliberalism in the IMF and the World Bank are legion,382 and their role in bringing 
about a “chastening” of neoliberalism and its opening up to some social goals is well 
documented.383 This pressure on neoliberalism may have been heightened by a shift of the 
gravitational center of international economic law away from the IMF/World Bank towards UN 
institutions under the leadership of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.384 These phenomena, 
combined with the energetic campaign in favor of linkage of trade and social issues in the 1990s,385 
might have pressured neoliberals into compromising on their anti-regulatory program so as to 
allow for some human rights, labor standards and environmental regulation. It is plausible that 
social legal thought, being more marginal, was not exposed to as much pressure from a broader 
audience. 
This brings us to human rights, the most malleable of all three discourses in the WTO and 
ILO 1994–2008 labor standards debates. We could see this malleability as symptomatic of the 
centrality of human rights in the contemporary era. Indeed, its malleability may attest to the fact 
that there was a critical mass of people willing to engage with the discourse to articulate anything 
from right-wing arguments on the impossibility of imposing any international labor standard 
absent state consent386 to left-wing arguments depicting all labor standards as indivisible human 
rights.387 Even if we exclude classical liberal emphasis on property and contract rights from the 
definition of contemporary human rights, as I have argued we should, the malleability remains 
considerable. 
It is not clear how this political configuration will evolve in the future. I have decided to end 
my analysis in 2008 precisely because there seem to be significant changes after that. It appears 
that in the wake of the Great Recession social legal thought was further strengthened vis-à-vis 
human rights in the ILO, as a reaction to “imbalances” in the global economy that led to destructive 
social results.388 Moreover, it seems that neoliberalism was rolled back among some international 
organizations because of a return to Keynesian approaches,389 though some scholars document 
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another comeback of global neoliberalism since then.390 Whatever future research into the post-
2008 might reveal, it is crucial to map the period of 1994 to 2008 in great detail, as I have done 
here, as it is a particularly dense nodal point of intellectual developments fateful for the future of 
debates about labor standards. 
To me, the malleability of the three discourses is the key programmatic question for those 
who want to intervene in debates on labor standards. It is also the question that intensely 
preoccupies the scholars quoted in the introduction as to the relationship between human rights 
and neoliberalism. I have meant to suggest a methodology to get better answers to that question 
than a simple-minded assertion of systematic complicity or mutual reinforcement, based on careful 
structural analysis of the way discourses are articulated and given form by a set of historically 
situated actors. Given the fatefulness of the 1994–2008 debates on labor standards, it is more than 
worthwhile to ponder over which languages important intellectual actors use and what 
argumentative structures and historical sediments they end up producing. The payoffs of such a 
study are both descriptive, in that they allow us to understand what work languages like human 
rights and neoliberalism are doing in the world, and strategic, as the labor standards debates of 
tomorrow will take place among the partial ruins of today’s argumentative cathedral, of which I 
have presented “one view.”391 The past will likely remain with us in a recognizable form, and 
knowing it well may be an indispensable first step towards thoroughly changing it in whatever 
direction seems right to us, in light of our own choices among the complex arguments that make 
up this ever-expanding yet astonishingly stable cathedral. 
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